The IAEA is becoming increasingly concerned that Syria has a covert nuclear program. Prior to 2007, it was rare to hear analysts publicly accuse Syria of having a nuclear program and those that did, reassured us they were at least a decade away from having the capability to produce a nuclear weapon. Then, Israel bombed a suspected nuclear reactor built with North Korean assistance in September 2007. The U.S. believes it was nearly completed and would have allowed the regime to produce plutonium that could be reprocessed into nuclear fuel.
The IAEA announced in February that their inspectors had found traces of uranium (which was not declared to the IAEA as required) at the site after visiting over the summer. Syria blamed this on the munitions the Israelis used to bomb the site, but the IAEA has pretty much dismissed that possibility. Today, Syria is refusing to give the inspectors access to three additional suspected nuclear sites and is failing to hand them documentation to prove the site was not a reactor.
Syria is also refusing to let the inspectors examine the debris that they removed from the site as soon as it was bombed. The US ambassador to the IAEA also said that satellite photos showed the Syrians cleaning up the three sites after the IAEA requested access to them.
These are clear indications that Syria has a covert nuclear weapons program, and in the intelligence world, it will be difficult to find the type of proof demanded by the public after the Iraqi WMD fiasco.