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Ryan Mauro's
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Monthly Analysis: January 2007 By Ryan Mauro TDCAnalyst@aol.com This month's major issue was the Bush Administration's new plan for the war in Iraq. For the first time, there is, in this author's opinion, a bona fide strategy to effectively combat the insurgency in Iraq. General David Petraeus, as he has demonstrated so competently in Mosul, is quite easily the best choice to lead the US military campaign in Iraq. In this author's opinion, the troop increase will be a beneficial development that will yield a positive effect in the Baghdad area. However, will the insurgents, after being ejected from Baghdad, simply relocate their operations elsewhere? More than likely, given their tactics to date, so stability in other areas, into which the insurgents relocate, will rest primarily on the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to effectively neutralize them. The main goal of the new plan should not be to simply eliminate all the insurgents encountered, as that may degrade Coalition forces' collaborative relationship with the Iraqi population. Insurgencies are effectively neutralized when the insurgents are left with no safe haven and/or support. The goal of the plan should be to drive the insurgents into unfriendly territory, such as the more peaceful Shi'ite south, or towards Kurdistan. The author has been studying counter-insurgency doctrine and has recognized the errors the Coalition forces have made in Iraq by not initially devising and implementing a competent and complementary strategy to effectively neutralize the insurgents. Emphasis to date has been solely focused on killing or capturing insurgents, but the main goal should be focused on engaging the Iraqi population. The primary reason Gen. Petraeus, and other commanders, like Col. McMaster in Tal Afar, along with US Special Forces, have been so successful, is they understand how to effectively neutralize the insurgents by involving the locals. These commanders had significant numbers of troops to implement Clear, Hold, Build and to protect the civilian population. But more importantly, they knew how to use the troops effectively. A US troop surge will be ineffective unless the forces are deployed correctly. For example:
The list of Gen. Petraeus' innovative
tactics is considerable, and indicates his creativity and fundamental
understanding of how to combat an insurgency-based conflict. For the first
time in nearly three years, the author is optimistic regarding US strategy
and possibility of US commanders achieving significant success in
neutralizing the insurgency in Iraq. Updates on Pre-War Intelligence The author was recently perusing some old notes with previous contacts, and discovered some interesting information not previously published. A Lebanese source contacted the author, and described a meeting he had with a relative, who lived in a small village, near the Syrian border. The source's relative described how in late 2004, and early 2005, "very long trucks" began digging at the bottom of a hill in the Bekaa Valley. The location, the source claimed, was near "an old agricultural lab". The source provided the author with an
overhead photograph of the specific area and indicated that witnesses had
described Syrian personnel dressed in Soviet uniforms, and noted that the
burial operation took place at night. The source claimed that witnesses
would not talk because Palestinian bases were nearby, and that it wasn't
too long ago that a mass grave was found several kilometers away. He also
described how a Lebanese Army contractor was murdered in 2005 near the
village. The Arab press is reporting that the
notebooks Saddam Hussein kept before he died describe how he tried to
"Islamize" the Ba'ath Party and move it away from secularism. In his
notes, he claims that he even convinced Michel Afflak to convert from
Christianity to Islam. [1] This, once and for all, should
discredit the notion that Saddam Hussein's regime was strictly secular.
On the day of Bush's speech, Coalition forces initiated an operation against the Iranian networks in Iraq, specifically Irbil. This development is very encouraging as it confirms that in the past the US has not moved against these networks, but is now. There has been considerable speculation regarding whether or not al-Maliki will allow Coalition forces to pursue Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, but it seems clear that, with the importation of Kurdish fighters into Baghdad, some operation may be in the works. However, questions remain about this tactic. Will the Shia be more accepting of a Kurdish presence than American? Will the Kurds, who don't speak Arabic, bring additional experience or, are they simply additional combat power? We're confident that al-Maliki will allow Coalition forces to tackle Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. Over the past few months, there was nearly a political realignment in the Iraqi parliament to depose al-Maliki and isolate al-Sadr from the government. For his own sake, al-Maliki really has no other choice. However, a Fallujah-style offensive on Sadr City is not an appropriate operation, at this time. The first priority should be an offensive in Anbar Province, via American-Iraqi combat power, or "village militia" backed by the sheikhs the Coalition forces recently won to their side. Why must the Mahdi Army threat be neutralized?
At the same time that Coalition forces are engaged in Anbar, they must also contain the five mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad that have been the focus of most of the recent violence. As Coalition forces combat the Sunni insurgents, they must likewise ensure that the Shiite death squads don't take advantage of the situation, otherwise the locals will turn to the insurgents for protection and support. Coalition forces must keep al-Sadr's forces, as well as the Iranian-backed death squads, as far away from the Sunni territory as possible. Relevantly, the Saudi National Security Assessment Project has assessed that Iran has at least 5,000 agents backing the Shiite death squads, and estimates the Mahdi Army's strength to be at 10,000 and the Badr Brigade's to be at 5,000. [2] Luckily, it seems the Mahdi Army is
under pressure to cave. The mayor of Sadr City has been negotiating, and
has been making major progress. A peace deal has been floated and is being
worked out. Under the deal, no one in Sadr City is allowed to carry arms
in public, it disarms (in theory) all militias in the city and Coalition
weapons searches won't be resisted. However, the US must bring security to
the area, end raids in Sadr City, release some detainees, bring in new
construction projects, and triple the number of police stations while
recruiting new police officers locally in order to reduce unemployment.
[3] Certainly there's some problems with the offer, but
negotiations mixed with physical pressure may work these out. A possible
compromise measure would be stopping American raids, but allowing Iraqi
government raids with Coalition back up, and some sort of system where
we're allowed to go after death squad leaders. Perhaps a "neighborhood
watch program" where local leaders get paid in proportion to the amount of
violence that occurs is workable. The Iranian network, that this author is confident forms the backbone of the insurgency in Iraq, is beginning to be exposed. Secret Iranian documents that US forces captured in Iraq, which have been authenticated, clearly indicate that Iran has been sponsoring both Shiite and Sunni insurgents - but not the Ba'athists. The Revolutionary Guards' al-Quds Force does work with individuals affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its ally, Ansar al-Sunna. Plans for attacks and phone numbers of Sunni terrorists were included in the captured documents. One document reportedly states that Iran must double its efforts to retain its influence among Sunni terrorists since the Gulf nations are expected to increase their own support for the Sunnis. The captured documents also indicate
that there is evidence of Al-Quds operatives secretly cooperating with the
Sunni insurgents who attacked the Golden Mosque, in Samarra, in February
2006, which provoked the sectarian violence. [4] If this
is true, this document should be published immediately to destroy any
sympathy Iraqi Shia may have for Iran, and to discredit insurgents' claims
of fighting for the good of the all Iraqis.
The Iranian opposition has released new details regarding Iran's extensive network in Iraq. According to their information, the al-Quds Force collects money in Ahwaz, and then escorts its operatives by Iranian security to the Shalamche border crossing to steal into Iraq and make their way into Najaf. Iran then utilizes the currency exchange centers to redirect the funds to their numerous front groups and charities, one of which is named "The Headquarters for the Reconstruction of Iraq's Holy Sites." These front groups then smuggle the weapons to the operatives who foment the violence. The advanced IEDs that are responsible for causing so many US casualties are reportedly produced in the neighborhood of Lavizan, in northern Tehran. [5] The Administration is finally fighting back. According to The Washington Post, Bush has authorized our military to capture or kill Iranian operatives in Iraq. Previously, we just detained them for a few days in a "catch and release program" that wouldn't escalate tension with Iran. Officials told the Post that over 150 Revolutionary Guards officers are believed to be in Iraq at any one time. The new plan will also be applied to Afghanistan, authorizes more aggressive operations against Hezbollah, movement towards international sanctions against Iran for harboring several dozen Al-Qaeda, more aggressive moves to cut Iranian funding off to Hamas, and to undermine Iranian interests among the Shiites in Afghanistan. [6] One Iranian captured so far is the
director of operations for the Revolutionary Guards. Ambassador Khalizad
said it's part of a new strategy to "go after the networks here [Iraq]."
[7] This admission, meant to inspire optimism, should
anger every American. It is an admission that we have tolerated the
Iranian terror networks in Iraq that have killed so many American
soldiers, and so many Iraqis. Iran's terrorist activity is
increasing in the Gulf, as reported by Saudi security. The Saudis intend
to respond by supporting Sunni insurgents in Iraq, to counter the
influence of Iranian Shiites. Such a proxy war will escalate, and in fact
is already doing so. Several reports from Gulf media sources have
described that Saudi intelligence, and an Iraqi parliament member, have
reported that Iran is forming a 10,000-strong "Brigade of Mecca" force, in
southern Iraq, near the Saudi border. The Saudis are concerned that this
force will be used to cause disturbances during the pilgrimage and
festivities. [8] Jamestown's Global Terrorism Analysis
released a significant new report regarding Iranian activity in
Afghanistan. Among the interesting items in the report is that, in March
2006, the official Afghan media reported that, during the first quarter of
2006 alone, the province of Herat arrested at least ten Iranian officials
involved in "illegal activity." The report also describes Iranian efforts
to build popular support in the country and increase intelligence
activity. [9] Instability continues in Lebanon as
Hezbollah threatens to collapse the government. Some observers believe
that Hezbollah acts in the best interest of the Lebanese Shia, but they
must confront new evidence. The former secretary-general of Hezbollah,
Sheikh Subhi al-Tufeili has criticized Hezbollah for being part of Iranian
intelligence. He criticized them for taking orders from outside of
Lebanon, and becoming a "tool" of external powers.
[10]
The regional arms race resulting from Iran's belligerent nuclear program is escalating. King Abdullah II has publicly stated that Jordan will begin developing nuclear power for "peaceful purposes." [11] Iran is also discussing nuclear cooperation with Indonesia. [12] The nuclear issue recently escalated, as Iran has banned IAEA inspectors in retaliation for the very limited sanctions the UN imposed. [13]A report in the British press claims that North Korea has agreed to share all its data from its nuclear test in the fall with Iran, possibly to help Iran with its own nuclear test as early as the end of 2007. Such cooperation has gone on a long time and this report is highly likely to be accurate. [14] Iran also announced plans to launch a satellite, which is a widely-known way of simulating a test for a long-range ballistic missile, as the satellite launcher can be adapted to a missile. Sean Osborne of the Northeast Intelligence Network (HomelandSecurityUS.com) has warned that this may be a test of the Iranian version of North Korea's Tae'Po-Dong 2 ICBM that they shot near Hawaii. If he's right, then that means Iran's missile program is eight years ahead of our intelligence estimates. Despite Iran's stridency, the regime's power continues to fracture. There are rumors that Iranian parliament members may move to impeach Ahmadinejad. Additionally, Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, an extremely senior cleric once slated to replace Khomeini until he criticized the power of the clerics who are not elected, has been coming out more forcefully lately in opposition to Ahmadinejad. His opposition to
Ahmadinejad however, should not lead anyone to conclude that Montazeri is
becoming, in any manner, pro-American. He is merely positing that
Ahmadinejad is handling "the enemy" (the West) incorrectly, and is causing
unnecessary hardships for ordinary Iranians, pointing to the increase in
food prices, due to UN sanctions. Economic problems are causing a lot of
anger and frustration among ordinary Iranians towards the government.
[15] While it appears that Iran is taking the lead role in actively sponsoring the insurgency in Iraq, Syria's role in the situation seems primarily for safe haven and safe passage. This is likely because of the success of the sectarian campaign for which Iran has more assets to deploy than Syria. Nonetheless, Syria's involvement must be documented. In Fiasco, on page 409, Colonel Derek Harbey, a military-intelligence expert in Iraq, states that there are four tracks for financing from Damascus that lead to Ramadi. Syrian funding to the insurgents there amounts to $1.2 million per month. The capture of some Syrians has reportedly led to new details regarding their efforts to foment turmoil in Iraq. The detainees reported that Ba'athist insurgents and Al-Qaeda operatives pay Syrian authorities for safe harbor, and that the Syrian embassy in Baghdad is used to supply insurgents and to coordinate their activities. The Al-Qaeda logistical effort in Syria is led by Mohammed Nassif, director of State Security, and Ali Yunis, chief of staff of General Assaf Shawkat, who heads Syrian intelligence. [16] Iraqi president Jalal Talabani has advised Iraqis that the government is well aware that Syria is harboring senior Saddam regime officials, who are aiding the insurgents. He argued against the notion that Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, though, is in Damascus as widely reported. He stated that al-Douri is in Yemen, and that the Iraqis are tracking his movements. [17] Although
indications of civil unrest in Syria are not nearly as elevated as they
were last year, instability in the Assad regime continues. Iran is
reportedly coming to Syria's rescue, utilizing their own successful model,
which Venezuela has also expressed interest in copying. Iran is helping
form and finance an Alawite militia loyal to Bashar Assad that he will
directly control. [18]
The Alawite militia
is similar to the Basij force in Iran, or the Fedayeen under Saddam's
regime. The intense political debate over a troop surge is creating some tension between Iraq and the US. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has criticized the Bush Administration claiming that the US could dramatically cut back its forces in Iraq within 3-6 months if commanders would accelerate the pace of arming the Iraqi Security Forces. The US is reluctant to do so out of concerns that the equipment will fall into the hands of the insurgents, who have infiltrated the security forces. Asia The spokesperson for Mullah Omar was
captured this month. He reportedly confessed that Mullah Omar is hiding in
Quetta, Pakistan under the protection of ISI operatives. Pakistan,
meanwhile, continues to claim that Omar is operating from southern
Afghanistan. China made the
news this month with its successful anti-satellite missile
test. [19] This should serve as a major warning to the US
military that its technological advantages may be jeopardized in the near
future. [1] Al-Arabiya, January 4, 2007 [2] Geostrategy-Direct.com, week of January 10, 2007 [3 New York Times, January 25, 2007 [4] New York Sun, January 3, 2007 [5] Iran Policy Committee Press Release, January 6, 2007 [6] Washington Post, Janaury 26, 2007 [7] International Herald Tribune/AP, January 24, 2007 [8] Gulf Daily News, January 9, 2007 [9 Jamestown.org, Global Terrorism Analysis, issue of January 18, 2007 [10] Memri.org, January 19, 2007 [11 Ha’aretz, January 19, 2007 [12] USA Today, January 11, 2007 [13] Reuters, January 22, 2007 [14] Telegraph, January 24, 2007 [15] Associated Press, January 22, 2007 [16] Geostrategy-Direct.com, week of January 24, 2007 [17 Reuters, January 20, 2007 [18] Middle East Newsline, January 19, 2007. [19] CNN, January 18, 2007 |