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Ryan Mauro's
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Monthly Analysis March-May 2007 By Ryan Mauro TDCAnalyst@aol.com Preface
I apologize for being so late with the monthly analyses, and combining three months into one. As many of you know, I am a student and have been simply swamped lately. I am considering ending the monthly analyses altogether, and just including my analysis thoughts in the weekly newsletter that will be e-mailed to readers by GlobalPolitician.com. I would appreciate your feedback on this possible change so please e-mail me your thoughts. Pre-War Intelligence Udate
Eric Edelman, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, has criticized the Pentagon report that attacked Doug Feith. Feith has published an extraordinary response to it on his own web site, www.dougfeith.com. Edelman claims that one of the vehicles Mohammed Atta used to travel to Prague was registered to an agent of the Abu Nidal Organization, who was being harbored and sponsored by Iraq. It was at this Prague meeting that some have alleged that Atta met with the Iraqi Counsel Al-Ani. The CIA no longer believes this meeting ever took place, but the Czechs who originally reported the meeting and subsequently deported al-Ani, still believe it occurred. Edelman claims that in 1998, Osama bin Laden actually met with Abu Nidal (Nidal was in Iraq at that time, but Edelman does not say if the meeting occurred there). At the meeting, bin Laden agreed to finance the Abu Nidal Organization "in return for unspecified assistance to Al-Qaeda." Edelman states that Abu Nidal’s group was likely a liaison with bin Laden, as the organization responded to Iraqi government directives.1
Former CIA director George Tenet’s book, released recently, claims that Vice President Cheney, Doug Feith, and other "hawks" in the Bush Administration exaggerated the intelligence on Iraq’s ties to al-Qaeda. However, in the book, Tenet also defends certain intelligence (in fact, the same intelligence that the so-called "hawks" used in making the case for war). Ironically, in doing so, Tenet makes a strong case that Iraq’s ties to al-Qaeda were indeed solid, and while there may not have been joint operations, these ties were certainly worrisome. Tenet describes how an al-Qaeda relationship with Iraq (and Iran) began in the 1990s, when Hasan al-Turabi, a spiritual leader in the Sudan, sought to bring them together. He confirms that senior operatives in al-Qaeda discussed the possibility of safe haven with the Iraqi government. Up to 200 members of al-Qaeda fled to Iraq in the fall of 2001, setting up camps in the northern part of the country. One camp was dedicated to the development of chemical and biological weapons. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi arrived in Baghdad for medical treatment in May of 2002 under a false name and also ran camps linked to an affiliate of al-Qaeda in northern Iraq. 100 operatives connected to the Zarqawi network would later be captured in Europe planning a massive wave of terrorist attacks using chemical and biological weapons, presumably from the camp set up in northern Iraq. In the spring and summer of 2002, over a dozen operatives affiliated with al-Qaeda found safe harbor in Baghdad to assist Zarqawi’s operations in northern Iraq. The Iraqi government never responded to requests to arrest these operatives. After this cell was established, more operatives arrived in Iraq, including Thirwat Shihata and Youssef Dardiri, two Egyptians said to be among the best operations planners for Egyptian Islamic Jihad (which is part of al-Qaeda). Western intelligence lost track of these two men, but do know that they operated in Baghdad as of October 2002. Tenet also confirmed that at least one senior member of Ansar al-Islam, the al-Qaeda affiliate in northern Iraq, served as a liaison with the Iraqi government. Al-Jazeera news network has often been described as "the mouthpiece of Al-Qaeda," and proof was published in May that Iraq was funding the al-Jazeera out of Qatar. Al-Jazeera is known for broadcasting the audio and videotapes of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other al-Qaeda leaders. The network is also accused by many of being the media arm of Sunni terrorism. The document, which is dated September 24, 2002, indicates that Iraq agreed to give 50,000 dinars to the network each month.2 The War In Iraq
In March, The Sunday Times published a very interesting poll of Iraqi opinion. It is questionable whether a truly credible poll can be acquired in a war zone like Iraq, especially when factoring the cultural and language barriers in conducting such a survey of public opinion. The poll may be the most credible to date since it’s the largest poll ever conducted in Iraq. Only 26% of Iraqis felt that the situation was better when Saddam Hussein was in power, while 49% prefer the current situation. Slightly over half of the Sunni population agrees that life was better under Saddam, which is understandable considering that their territory is where the majority of the fighting has been concentrated. 29% of the Sunnis feel life is better today than it was before, and an overwhelming majority of Iraqis believe Iraq should remain one country (57% of the Sunnis and 69% of the Shiites). The Kurds, as most would expect, prefer independence. On the other hand, 53% of the Iraqi population believes security will improve when Coalition forces leave.3 This is probably because they didn’t experience the wrath of al-Qaeda and other terrorists until Western troops arrived, so they equate a Western presence with the insurgency. One must also consider that, in many cases, Coalition forces have not brought adequate security so, in the view of many Iraqis, the presence of Coalition forces brought more insecurity as the insurgents and Coalition forces battled it out with no clear victor. It would be interesting to see a before-and-after poll to determine whether Iraqis viewed Coalition forces more favorably when they used more force and brought security, or if they preferred insecurity over occupation.
The Mehdi Army reportedly split up over the past three months. Moqtada al-Sadr claims rogue elements are responsible for ongoing sectarian violence, which may or may not be true. It is being reported that 3,000 Mehdi militants are being directly financed by Iran and no longer are loyal to al-Sadr. It is possible that Iran used its support for al-Sadr’s forces to create dependency and then took over part of the militia. Two senior Mehdi commanders reportedly claimed that hundreds of militants were sent to Iran to be trained by the IRC, whereas others ended violent operations and wanted to work politically. When the new Baghdad security plan began being implemented, many militants left Baghdad and received $600 upon entering Iran. As these fighters agree to work under the command of Iran, and their proxies, they’re paid $200 per month. Iran is using relief agencies for refugees as a front to recruit and send out these militants.4 In early March, many suspected Iran of playing a larger role in attacks on Coalition helicopters and in sophisticated ambushes. One missile that downed a British helicopter and killed five soldiers is said to have been a shoulder-launched SA-14 Stella smuggled in from Iran. More evidence was also revealed indicating that Iran is also backing Sunni insurgents, despite the conventional wisdom in our intelligence services and diplomatic circles that this is impossible.5 More evidence was also revealed indicating that Iran is also backing Sunni insurgents, despite the conventional wisdom in our intelligence services and diplomatic circles that this is impossible. The chief spokesperson for the U.S. military in Iraq stated recently that captured insurgents had detailed how Iranian intelligence was supporting Sunni terrorists, and training Shiite extremists on Iranian territory. Arms made in Iran as recently as 2006 were captured in early April in a predominantly Sunni area in Baghdad.6
There appears to be a split in the Baathist element of the insurgency. Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri is on one side, with Mohammed Yunis Ahmed, a former Iraqi general, on the other. Yunis is more likely to accept some sort of deal with the Iraqi government. Yunis’ representatives reportedly walked out of a meeting held in Halab in northwestern Syria. Soon after, al-Douri publicly expelled Yunis from the Baath Party. Yunis is viewed to be closer to the Syrian government because the Syrians reportedly told the Iraqis that they’d only permit contact with Yunis if they lobbied for certain changes in American policy.7 There is currently a $1 million bounty on Yunis. Around this same time, al-Douri announced the expulsion of 30 Baath generals, calling them "traitors."
The most important development in Iraq over the past three months was the creation of a wide array of tribal alliances to fight the insurgents. The alliances, called the “Anbar Awakening,” which is opposed by the Association of Muslim Scholars, has 41 tribes, or sub-tribes, involved in it. Sheikh Abu Rishawi, its leader, has been complaining that Iraq’s Interior Ministry has not been giving his forces enough equipment, food or guns to move full force. Most of Abu Rishawi’s followers are using their own weapons to fight the insurgents. Abu Rishawi claimed that, if he was equipped properly, he would wipe out al-Qaeda from Anbar Province in five months.8 I suggest reading an excellent article from The Los Angeles Times. After the sheikhs in Ramadi told their men to join the local police, 4,500 joined. This is a tremendous development, considering how few Sunnis had previously joined the fight. (It should be noted that, in the tribal culture, the sheikh’s word is law.) An additional 2,500 Sunnis joined paramilitary units called "Emergency Response Units" and were trained either in Jordan or on a U.S. base in Ramadi. Unfortunately, according to Sunni politician Omar Abdul-Sattar, 11,000 volunteers from Sunni areas west of Baghdad have been waiting "months" to hear about their applications to join the army. This is a disgrace. As the U.S. applies pressure on the Iraqis to "stand up," volunteers for the Iraqi armed forces wait, seemingly endlessly, to enlist. In the mean time, these volunteers must find other jobs to feed their families. And one may confidently speculate regarding the type of jobs that may are available, considering that criminal elements are the prominent CEOs of the Sunni Triangle. The Iraqi and American governments must find creative means to shorten this waiting period and more quickly integrate new volunteers into the services, or an important advantage may be lost. The success of the tribal alliances is causing similar alliances to appear throughout Iraq. In Diyala Province, where most militants fled when the surge began, an alliance was announced in Baqubah. This sort of strategy of embracing, not marginalizing the sheikhs, should have been implemented long ago. Unfortunately, it did not, and the Coalition Provincial Authority had an opportunity to make it happen. It was rejected. According to a letter from a retired, senior Army intelligence officer given to Colonel Patrick Lang, between December 2003 and mid-January 2004, 19 sheikhs from Anbar Province talked to the military about forming an alliance against al-Qaeda and the foreign fighters. The sheikhs asked for U.S. military assistance, and agreed to disarm their men, recognize elected politicians and recognize the police forces. They requested that the U.S. line up businesses to come into their areas once the area was secured, and an Arab-American did so. Each sheikh, according to the letter, requested $200 per man in their forces each month, starting with 50 men. It is believed that the offer was not presented to Paul Bremer. The plan, despite being viewed positively by the military, was rejected by the Coalition Provincial Authority, who felt that it undermined the plan to develop a modern democracy.9
Cross-sectarian opposition continues to form in Iraq’s parliament to oppose the government of Norui al-Maliki, which is becoming more and more viewed as ineffective and corrupt due to its sectarianism, ties to Iran, and alliance with Moqtada al-Sadr. In early March, the Iraqi Fadhila Party quit the United Iraq Alliance (the bloc that brought al-Maliki to power). The Fadhila Party held 15 seats in parliament. The party stated that they want to end sectarian-based politics. There were rumors that Fadhila would ally itself with the new political party formed by ex-Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, a secular Shiite, but this has not yet happened. Some analysts, including myself, continue to believe that there is a strong possibility of a cross-sectarian alliance winning a majority in Iraq’s parliament, and ending the rule of al-Maliki. However, it is more likely that the mere threat of this happening will cause a shift in the attitudes and policies of the government in order to derail such an effort. The opposition needs 138 seats in Iraq’s parliament to hold a majority. The Shiite alliance currently holds 128 seats, and the Kurdish alliance has 53. For now, the Kurds are not joining the opposition. This political split gives the Kurds overwhelming leverage, and given their strong non-sectarian and secular politics, this is a good thing for American security. Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List holds 25 seats. Allawi has allied with Adnan Dulaimi of the Accord Front (44 seats) and Salih Mutlak’s Sunni Arab National Dialogue Front (11). Mishaan Juburi’s Reconciliation and Reconstruction List (3 seats) and the Fadhilla (15) have also left Maliki’s alliance, so if the opposition were to unite, they’d hold 98 seats and need 40 more. The development of a cross-sectarian bloc in Iraq’s parliament is among the most positive developments over the past three months.
It appears now that the British will withdraw from Iraq. The first reduction occurred in the final months of Tony Blair’s stay in office, handing power over to Basra. While the Bush Administration hailed this as proof that the Iraqis can take over their own security in some areas, thus allowing Coalition forces to leave, startling reports indicate that Basra has been taken over by militias, some of which are backed by Iran. The best report that I’ve seen to date on this turn of events is available at The Guardian UK. Coalition forces must launch another Baghdad-like offensive in Basra to secure the area, as it is becoming a focal point for moving Iranian weapons into the country and is critical for Iraq to succeed economically. In An announcement that coincided with the first British reduction, the nation of Georgia has decided to increase its troop presence in Iraq from 850 to over 2,000.10
There are rumors (and credible ones, in my opinion) that the U.S. is planning to increase total troop strength in Iraq to over 180,000, and possibly as high as 200,000 (and doubling the number of combat troops). Some rumors suggest that the White House is resisting Pentagon requests for additional troops, and if the rumor proves to be true, this is not encouraging. Such rumors may have stemmed from complaints by General Benjamin Mixon, the commander of the division in charge of Diyala Province, who told the press that he didn’t have adequate forces in the area. However, almost immediately after his complaints were printed, an additional 3,000 troops were approved to go to Diyala.11 We simply do not have sufficient corroboration at this point to state, definitively, that the White House is resisting requests for additional reinforcements. Middle East
During the hearing for Abu Faraj al-Libi, who was captured in Pakistan in May 2005, new evidence emerged that Syria is allowing al-Qaeda to operate in-country. Al-Libi said that, in September of 2004, several al-Qaeda operatives met with him in Syria to discuss planned operations in the United States, Europe, and Australia. This seems to confirm recent statements by Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druzes in Lebanon, that Syria was supporting an al-Qaeda-linked network in Lebanon.12 A Syrian opposition group called the Reform Party of Syria published an excellent report regarding Syria’s involvement with al-Qaeda. Syria is supporting Fatah al-Islam, an al-Qaeda affiliate terrorist organization believed to be responsible for twin bus bombings in Beirut in March. RPS is reporting that their sources in the Lebanese security services claim that Syrian military intelligence manages a group called Fatah al-Intifada, which gave rise to Fatah al-Islam. Fatah al-Islam is headed by Sheikh Absi, who claims to be a Palestinian Jordanian. The Reform Party’s sources contest this, stating that Absi grew up in the Yarmuk refugee camp in Syria and joined Syria’s air force. Absi later was jailed for three years and then released with other terrorists, and formed Jund al-Sham, which some suspect of being a Syrian front. The Syrian opposition group argues that it is highly unlikely the Syrians would release Absi unless some sort of deal had been struck.13 It is probably not a coincidence that Absi, since being released, is involved in destabilizing Lebanon, a goal Syria has worked towards for a long time.
The crisis with Iran is likely to shift into high gear very soon. IAEA inspectors have concluded that Iran has solved most of the technological problems involved in its uranium enrichment program, allowing them to enrich at a far larger scale than before. Iran is believed to be operating at least 1,300 centrifuges at its Natanz site alone.14 Europe
A leaked British intelligence report claims that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is planning its first large-scale attacks in the United Kingdom, and on other Western targets. British intelligence reports that al-Qaeda’s plans for terrorist attacks are to be implemented with the assistance of al-Qaeda elements currently harbored in Iran. One captured operative stated that the upcoming attacks are to be on par with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is unclear whether this indicates al-Qaeda is planning to emulate the atomic bombings by method, utilizing a radiological "dirty" bomb, or a nuclear weapon, or by some other conventional method designed to achieve casualty count equivalency to the casualties in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The intelligence report speculates that such an attack may coincide with the exit of Tony Blair as Prime Minister.15 Russia
In early March, the string of suspicious deaths of individuals opposing President Putin of Russia continued. Paul Jogal, an expert on Soviet intelligence, was shot dead four days after telling Dateline that the Russian government was responsible for the assassination of FSB defector Litvinenko.16 It would appear that anyone who may have information regarding Litvinenko’s death, or who will point to Putin as being responsible for Litvinenko’s death, are being targeted. Russia increased its oppression of the media as well. Russia has seized the largest radio news network and put it under government control, and among the rules for news journalists is that at least half of the reports on Russia must be "positive." The managers at the Russian News Service told the journalists that opposition leaders can not be mentioned on air and the U.S. is to be portrayed as an enemy.17 In an additional step backwards toward the old Communist milieu, the Russian parliament voted to restore the Communist hammer and sickle to the official flag of the Russian Army.18
The Russians have long been accused of waging cyber warfare against the United States and members of NATO. The latest attack, on Estonia, received some brief media attention. The three-week attack disabled the web sites of newspapers, banks, businesses and government agencies and ministries. Experts feel the attack is simply too large and sophisticated to be implemented by a group of freelance hackers.19 Asia
In Afghanistan, evidence was revealed that Iran is involved in the insurgency, possibly allying with its former Taliban enemy. General Peter Pace has reported that Iranian mortars, C4 explosives, and other equipment has been found in Kandahar Province in southern Afghanistan.20 Africa
A federal judge has ruled that the government of Sudan is responsibile for the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 by al-Qaeda. The success of the operation was wholly due to Sudan’s allowing of al-Qaeda camps to operate in that country, and members of the Sudanese government providing the operatives with diplomatic passports and pouches.21
[1] Washington Times, "Inside the Ring," April 13, 2007. [2] Sotaliraq, translated at MEMRI.org, May 14, 2007. [3] The Sunday Times, March 18, 2007. [4] AP/USA Today, March 21, 2007. [5] Telegraph, March 3, 2007. [6] New York Times, April 12, 2007. [7] Los Angeles Times, April 24, 2007. [8] Associated Press, Washington Post, March 25, 2007. [9] AFP, May 3, 2007. [10] Associated Press, March 9, 2007. [11] RFERl.org, May 13, 2007. [12] American Spectator, March 19, 2007. [13] Reform Party of Syria, April 2, 2007. [14] New York Times, May 14, 2007. [15] The Times (UK), April 22, 2007. [16] Washington Post, March 3, 2007. [17] New York Times, April 21, 2007. [18] BBC, May 5, 2007. [19] Guardian, May 17, 2007. [20] Reuters, April 17, 2007. [21] AP/Newsmax, March 14, 2007.
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