- An interesting article was sent to the author in October. As reported by Richard Miniter, an Iraqi defector to Turkey going by the name of "Abu Mohammed" spoke to Gwynne Roberts of England's Sunday Times.  Mohammed claimed that, in 1997, he was a colonel in the Fedayeen and went to the suspected terrorist training camp known as Salman Pak and saw that men were being trained to hijack aircraft, specifically a Boeing 707, utilizing knives. Mohammed said that Colonel Jamil Kamil and Major Ali Hawas met him at the site and that Major Hawas told him that the men he saw in line for food were members of "Osama Bin Laden's group," the PKK and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq .

- An Iraqi Intelligence Service memo dated March 28, 2001 discusses how the Iraqi government should react to the expected hard-line the new Bush Administration would take.  Among the interesting quotes from the memo are "Prepare…call to strike the presence and interests of America " and "work to commit some nations like France, China, Russia and Japan to economical agreements that make implementation of the smart sanctions to have negative effect to the interests of these nations."

-  Another document from March 25, 2003 indicates that the PFLP terrorist organization led by Ahmad Gibril pledged to Iraqi officials in Damascus to send 500 fighters, including some trained in "suicide martyrdom" through Syria. The meeting was approved by Taha Yassin Ramadan, then a vice president of Iraq. It also discusses the use of remotely-guided bombs.

 -  A newly elected Democratic congressman, Chris Carney, has confirmed that Iraq worked with Al-Qaeda, even though he opposed the decision to invade Iraq. He worked as a senior counter-terrorism and intelligence advisor for Doug Feith in the Pentagon, and stated that Iraq had links to every terrorist group in the region. He also stated that suggestions - with supporting information -  that an insurgency would take place in Iraq were brushed off.  He stated that on a 0-10 scale, Iraqi ties to Al-Qaeda were about a 2.5. ¹

Sectarian violence and the U.S. daily death toll in Iraq dramatically increased in October, and some said it was timed for the U.S. mid-term elections. Whatever the reason, the U.S. has reached an extremely challenging dilemma: The more aggressively the U.S. responds to the militias, the less stable the Iraqi government becomes, yet the U.S. cannot allow such violence to continue.  It must be remembered that political support from Moqatada al-Sadr was responsible for electing Nouri al-Maliki.  Additionally, aside from a vicious military offensive, al-Sadr cannot be defeated by the Coalition forces because of support from Iran.  Iran continues to send millions of dollars and equipment, including high-grade military explosives and specialized timers, to al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.²  The equipment used by the Mehdi Army is said to bear Iranian "fingerprints" and is of the same make that Hezbollah used in its recent conflict with Israel. In additional raids by the Iraqis, a modern communications system from Iran's Defense Ministry was seized, and pictures were posted on the Internet.³

Moqtada al-Sadr is claiming that he's lost control of the Mehdi Army, and that "rogues" are responsible for the sectarian violence. The sectarian violence is not politically beneficial to al-Sadr, as the vast majority of Iraqis oppose it. However, if he wants to advance Iran's interests, destabilize the government, hold some leverage over the Iraqi leadership, and force the removal of U.S. troops, then he would likely back such violence. The question is:  Is al-Sadr playing a clever political gambit by having his militants conduct such violence, and then denying his role, or has he indeed lost control of the Mehdi Army to genuinely rogue members?

New evidence indicates that Iran is also sponsoring radical terrorist groups rather than just the Shiite militia. The Guardian recently interviewed a terrorist, going by the name "Abdullah", who described how he worked for Abdullah Shafi, a Kurdish terrorist from northern Iraq. "Abdullah" claimed Shafi led Ansar al-Islam and was expelled from Iran after the U.S. invaded Iraq because he was mobilizing suicide bombers. "Abdullah" explained that he was trained in a camp on Iranian territory and given safe haven, money, weapons and a place to stay.  Abdullah claimed that 19 of his 20 campmates were sent to fight in Iraq, but he was sent to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban and was captured in Afghanistan.⁴

Con Coughlin reported that the Revolutionary Guards' Al-Quds Force are training "hundreds" of Al-Qaeda operatives at camps on the outskirts of Tehran that have been previously used by other sponsored groups like Hezbollah. Key leaders have been harbored since 2001, and the increased relationship is the result of orders from Ahmadinejad. According to the report, Iran is building relationships with rising figures in the group, such as Seif al-Adel, in order to increase their influence over the groups activities as the power of the senior leadership declines.⁵

The biggest development in Iraq, obviously, was the verdict to hang Saddam Hussein for his role in the massacre of around 150 Shiites in Dujail in 1982. This is a big development since it will provide valuable insight into the insurgency. There were some pro-Saddam demonstrations in Tikrit and other places, none of which indicated significant popular support, but certainly enough to support an insurgency. Although large-scale violence did not follow the verdict, we need to observe closely how the insurgents respond to this development.

If there is a significant insurgency response over the next few weeks, then would be clear that their goal is a return to power of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party. This would be discouraging since the Coalition thought no one would be loyal to such a cause. On the other hand, it could also demonstrate that, by executing Saddam and the top leadership of the Ba'ath Party, the insurgency's goal of reinstituting the Ba'ath Party can be dealt a severe, if not fatal, blow. If the verdict is viewed as irrelevant, then there are other factors behind the insurgency that are more complex, and thus, more difficult to address.

There is a cycle in Iraq that must be broken. The lack of security due to the mostly Sunni insurgency has caused an increase in power for local hard-line leaders who use militia to protect the community, many of which are tied to Iran. Major elements of these militias, usually the Mehdi Army, but parts of the Badr Brigade have also played a role, contribute to sectarian violence, which results in increased support for the Sunni insurgency. Sometimes the conflict is essentially anti-American/democracy Sunnis killing anti-American/democracy Shiites, and vice versa but, be that as it mat be, this conflict results in continued instability and always expands to include attacks on civilians.

By supporting sectarian violence, Iran has successfully been able to polarize the political groups in Iraq, destabilize the government and reduce Iraqi control outside of Baghdad, reduce the influence of the moderate Ayatollah al-Sistani, create more support and power for Iranian-backed militia, decrease unity in the Iraqi security forces, and inflict U.S. and Iraqi casualties resulting in an increased likelihood of an American withdrawal.

As noted earlier, Moqtada al-Sadr claims he no longer has firm control over the entire Mehdi Army, and some rogue members are responsible for sectarian violence.  The Telegraph in the U.K. reported on the Shia version of Zarqawi (known as Abu Deraa) who has killed thousands of Sunnis.⁶   Deraa reportedly left the Mehdi Army in early 2006 and is behind much of the sectarian violence. It would be interesting if evidence should came to light that Abu Deraa is receiving Iranian support, or has any level of cooperation with the Mehdi Army.

Those hoping that James Baker's group will yield some magical plan to solve the problems in Iraq are seriously deluded.  As detailed in some conservative publications, there are people involved in the Iraq Study Group who have long been liberal activists of the Fahrenheit-911 mold.  James Baker also comes from the mold that advocates stability in the Middle East rather than democratic change due to the unpredictability of it.  We'll have to wait and observe the results.  Hopefully, Bush's loyalty to his family friends won't lead to a major political defeat.  For more information on this subtopic, read:http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/850ulqxz.asp.

There are also pro-Iranian intellectuals working in the Baker group. Iranian opposition activists continually warn about the sophisticated, well-funded PR operations run by the regime, and have pointed to two figures in the group, Houshang Amir Ahmadi and Hamid Dabashi. Ahmadi and Dabashi are staunch advocates of the "stability-first" premise, and oppose any harsh measures against Iran, instead arguing for diplomacy and for the rationality of the regime.

Also this month, the US decided to double the Iraqi security forces. This should have been done long ago. A bigger issue, though, is how the training of the Iraqi security forces has gone so poorly. It is easy for commentators to claim that the Iraqis simply don't care, or that a withdrawal is needed to force them to take charge, but perhaps the failure is based on four issues:

- Essential personnel joined the insurgency or found other jobs after the army was disbanded.

- The poor security situation has resulted in more personnel finding comfort in militia. 

- Potential personnel believe the U.S. is bound to withdrawal and leave them to get slaughtered like in 1991. 

- The U.S. training effort has been flawed.

Leaked U.S. Army documents have listed several mistakes the U.S. has made in training the Iraqis, including a lack of standardized guidelines with which to prepare U.S. advisors, a lack of experience among U.S. personnel, a lack of personnel with experience in the surrounding culture, a lack of qualified interpreters, and too intense a focus on getting the Iraqis quickly into combat. The documents even cite a lack of "office materials" as a problem. One example of a common problem is that Iraqis who have more experience militarily are being instructed by American advisors with lesser experience.⁷

The author feels that there should be a significant increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq to facilitate this training, and that the U.S. needs to accelerate the handover of the Iraqi intelligence apparatus and military to the government, so they have no excuse. Once the Iraqi security forces increase over the next few months, the U.S. must address the following question: Has an increase in the Iraqi security forces correlated to a decline in insurgent violence or, at least, some success toward that end? If not, then there must be an immediate change in policy.

The Pentagon reportedly looked at three options for changing the course in Iraq:

-  "Go Big," involving a significant U.S. troop increase and a broad spectrum counter-insurgency campaign, was shelved due to over-stretching of the U.S. military (this is the proposal that best suits the author's view); 

-  "Go Long" involving a decreasing US presence and focusing mostly on expanding the training and advising of Iraqi forces.

- "Go Home" means withdrawing, which has been rejected for obvious reasons.

The likely plan, according to The Washington Post, is a hybrid of the first two, calling for an increase of 20-30,000 troops to secure Baghdad, increase training the Iraqis, and a phased withdrawal to a level possibly as low as 60,000 troops. ⁸

This highlights the need to expand the U.S. military. The fact that the U.S. can't effectively prosecute this war to the best of its considerable ability because of "over-stretching the military" is pathetic. If the conflict in Iraq is so crucial in the war on terrorism, the U.S. should be willing to take whatever measures are necessary to achieve victory. Equally pathetic is the U.S. failure to rebuild the military after the severe cuts of the 1990s.

Professor William Stuntz, writing in The Weekly Standard, made an excellent observation, as many others have: The more troops in the area, the less casualties and violence there are. For example, between November 2004 and February 2005, the number of Coalition forces in Iraq rose by 18,000. During this time, the number of Iraqi casualties declined by two-thirds, and the number of U.S. soldiers wounded fell by three-fourths. In the summer of 2005, these numbers reversed, and casualties rose.

In September and November of 2005, the number rose by 23,000 and the casualties fell again in early 2006.  Again, the troops left and casualties rose. It is clear that the opinion of those who argue that a larger U.S. military presence only results in more nationalist-inspired violence is simply not consistent with the statistics.

Corruption is another significant problem in Iraq and is often blamed on the U.S..  We might recall that corruption was brought into public view under Paul Bremer's Coalition Provincial Authority and Iyad Allawi's government.   An example was the former Minister of Electricity under these two figures, Aiham al-Sammarae, was recently released from jail by U.S. personnel carrying weapons. Since al-Sammarae was a prominent Republican from Chicago, some questioned whether he was placed in a position of authority simply for knowing the right people. He was charged with corruption, embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds and was given a two-year jail sentence. If it is true that the U.S. was behind freeing him, it is most likely because of his role in negotiating with insurgent groups and the effect on Iraqi morale.  Regardless, trust in U.S. intentions in Iraq was severely damaged by this story.

In Iran, the period of late September and early October was genuinely frightening for the mullahs.  Ayatollah Boroujerdi, who has called for secular rule, was arrested by the regime. The Ministers of Information and Security reportedly demanded to have his severed head, and Boroujerdi's followers resisted the efforts of the Iranian authorities for hours, causing an anti-regime rally to expand to thousands. It was so powerful in fact that the protestors managed to hold security agents who had acid bottles in their pockets, after the agents began attempting to violently suppress them.  On the KRSI radio station, nationwide revolts were called for, and Boroujerdi stated that anyone who respected him as a spiritual source should lay down their arms. Eventually Boroujerdi was subdued by the Iranians, probably before word about the revolt went nationwide.

This event truly demonstrates the mullahs' fears about internal opposition, and is the best example of why the U.S. needs to support regime change. We can only wonder what would have happened had Western leaders brought international attention to Boroujerdi, and if Internet blogs, and respected opposition leaders like Reza Pahlavi, Hossein Khomeini (the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini), and all the others had called for a peaceful uprising for regime change.

The U.S. needs to support the Iranian opposition whenever and wherever possible.  Among the figures calling for regime change (specifically financial aid) is a top student activist named Manucher Mohammadi, whose brother died in Evin prison after seven years of detainment and torture. ⁹  Some Iranian opposition figures oppose direct U.S. aid, but all agree that the U.S. and Europe need to challenge the regime publicly, and provide moral and political support.  The lack of political warfare on the part of the U.S. is very discouraging.

Geostrategy-Direct.com'sissue for the week of November 22, 2006 reported that Arab intelligence sources are reporting that the U.S. and UK are using Iraqi territory to train Arab and Kurd operatives to attack Iranian oil facilities in order to destabilize the regime. This isn't necessarily a negative thing, but it has to be done carefully.