Washington DC, December 9, 2006/Reform Syria Blog/ -- It is the impression of many international states, and to a certain degree some of the more pessimistic Syrian opposition groups, that the position of Baschar al-Assad has dramatically improved following the close alliance he initiated with Iran and the appearance, at least, that the UN sponsored Brammertz investigation into the killing of Hariri has not yet turned the corner in terms of pointing the finger at the killers of the popular ex-prime minister of Lebanon.

Some in the Syrian opposition question the facade of power that Assad has successfully projected recently. In fact, RPS believes he is weaker than ever.

In 1976, after Assad ordered Syrian troops into Lebanon, many of the Syrian Generals who successfully waged that war asked for a meeting with Hafez al-Assad. It is rumored that they complained to Assad that their victory is not being rewarded to which Hafez al-Assad responded by giving them a green light to pilfer Lebanon. This is how the now infamous Syrian prevalent corruption found its roots.

The Syrian Generals went on a streak of such immoral depravity that included, amongst other things, trading drugs; much of it with some Lebanese they found willing partners in crime -- today, these same Lebanese are considered the backbone of the Assad supporters in Lebanon. No need to wonder why a Lebanese would side with Iran or Syria anymore, all one has to do is follow the money.

Lebanon was a cash machine  for the Syrian echelon of the security and military establishments to dip into to line their own personal pockets. But in the late nineties, Lebanese government officials started to complain privately that the combined rising debt on borrowed funds that helped re-build Lebanon, after a devastating 15-year civil war, and the pilfering by the Syrian occupiers and their Lebanese cohorts was too heavy a burden for Lebanon to sustain if the country wished to see its economy prosper and the Lebanese business community return to its glory days of turning Lebanon into the Middle East gateway to western goods and services. That was the main issue that drove Rafik Hariri, the architect of the New Lebanon, to rebel against the Syrian occupiers and eventually prompted him to support a UN Resolution, with the help of France, to force Syria out of Lebanon.

That was on the Lebanon side. But on the Syrian side, different dynamics shaped the regime Achilles' Heel.

Eventually, the corrupt practices and the pilfering that went unchallenged in Lebanon spilled over into Syria when rotating Generals, Colonels, Captains, and Lieutenants arrived back home to see an economy in shambles incapable of sustaining with any continuity their voracious appetite for remuneration. Their diminished Lebanese returns ultimately forced the Syrian brass to impose on the Syrian business community and other interest groups a sharing arrangement that not only planted the seeds of corruption in today's Syria but also damaged directly the Syrian economy by taxing heavily the traditional business families, which is the only group that had the capacity to sustain any meaningful economic growth. The organized racketeering became institutionalized and eventually led other civilian camps and interest groups, in the Syrian government, to openly seek remuneration from traditional Syrian government sources of revenues. A good example was the giveaway of the main cellular license to Rami Makhlouf, Assad's cousin and a front for Assad, for free thus creating a government net book loss of more than $700m according to some estimates.

But Syria is not Lebanon. The difference was that the Lebanese economy had a certain resiliency to it because of the entrepreneurship of its resourceful Christians; however, the Syrian economy, which is totally based on a socialist Arab economy (Industries belonged to the State, private businesses belonged to the ruler) never did have the same resiliency and when corruption became so prevalent, Assad had to keep finding ways to keep the troops happy in return for their loyalties. Soon enough, corruption started ravaging the social structure in Syria; many tribal leaders were given the opportunity to smuggle, government employees were allowed to seek bribes for normal government services, and most damaging of all Assad turned a blind eye to a judicial system that performed best to the highest bidder.

If one adds the economic sanctions and the political pressure Syria is enduring as a result of Assad's tactics, in addition to lack of real investments by the international community, one can almost see clearly that Assad is under immense economic and financial pressure; so much so that he had to issue a decree in 2005 proclaiming that the State can no longer guarantee jobs to its graduates every year (Students took to the street but their anger was violently squashed).

What keeps Assad in power today is the loyalty of a multi-layer of powerful Syrian families, tribal leaders, military and security personnel, professional associations, and a judiciary beholden to bribes whose interests lie in the corruption of the system Assad facilitated to stay in power. However, this cobweb of interests is being torn apart because prior to the Iraq War, Syria enjoyed enough revenues to pay for loyalties, but after the US shut down the oil Iraqi pipeline in 2003 and after Syria left all these revenues behind when it left Lebanon, the pie has gotten smaller causing some disillusionment amongst some of the tribal leaders and some of the powerful Syrian families. Less money and more people to share the pie means more pressure. Like a credit card whose minimum payments increase the debt, Assad's loyalty system is coming apart at the seams. That is why Assad is fighting so hard for Lebanon because the country could mean his survival.

The fashion by which Assad's government extracted loyalty in return for its own security invites admiration for the security apparatus of Syria. As an example, the Syrian security formed a youth civilian movement called "Shabeeha" whose role is to break any civil demonstration to show the world that the "people" of Syria are against unruly reformists and not the government itself. The "Shabeeha" movement was instrumental in beating the well-known dissident Riad Seif about five months ago. The civilian families who control the "Shabeeha" are entangled in suspect smuggling operations. But because of the "Smaller Pie" syndrome the families are starting to complain that their economic interests have been diminished to a point that it makes no sense anymore to pursue the same venues.

The same goes for loyal tribes who were armed by the regime to control civil disobedience, and in case of emergency, to defend the regime itself. These tribes are starting to consider the price they are paying in support of Assad, which may not be worth anymore the returns from their illegal operations given the smaller pie they are now sharing with the military and other interest groups; some are becoming increasingly more vocal and there lies the most important secret weapon of the Syrian opposition by which not only can Assad be brought down but also contain these loyalists with promises of a better economy by seeking their cooperation to maintain order and control violence (This explains why the Saudi Military Attaché in the Saudi Embassy in Damascus was caught visiting these tribes).

Some in the Syrian opposition today are cajoling the Ba'athists in the Syrian government in the hope that they will turn against Assad; Khaddam, the ex-vice president of Syria, has even sent public signals to Assef Shawkat, the head of the military intelligence, that he is forgiven if ever he participates in bringing the regime down. This naive approach, after we saw how Ghazi Kanaan, the ex-minister of interior, was forced to commit suicide, shows the desperation on the part of the Syrian opposition to effectively pressure the regime in the hope it falls. The Alawites will never turn against Assad even though the majority of Alawites are suffering from the Assad's rule, some at a much higher price than any paid by a normal Syrian because Assad believes they ought not oppose his rule no matter.

If the Syrian opposition has failed, it has because of misreading the architecture of the interest groups and the societal landscape that holds these groups together. Our bidding has always rested on either getting help from the international community or uniting the opposition in the belief that a stronger opposition will bring the regime down.

Corruption in Syria is Assad's Achilles Heels. If we understand how it greases the Ba'athist machine in return for loyalty, we may be able not only to bring the Assad regime down but also to do it with minimum violence. It is something very much worth our attention and worth formulating a strategy to take advantage of if ever the United States finds itself with no exit strategy from Iraq but to bring the Assad regime down.

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