The Iraqis seem to be the only ones who get it. Something is occurring behind the scenes in that war-torn land; something that is likely going to lead to a spike in violence, albeit a necessary spike. As we debate the nuances of the Iraq Study Group's findings, elected Iraqi parliamentarians of all stripes are coming to the conclusion that the agents who seek a sectarian war in Iraq must be confronted politically and militarily by the Iraqi state itself.

We are beginning to see something interesting in Iraqi politics that we have sadly seen only far and few between: Iraqi leaders crossing faux divides, taking responsibility for their actions, and mending together for a common purpose. Take for example Tariq al Hashemi and Abdul Aziz al Hakim; the former a Sunni Islamist leading the largest Sunni bloc in Iraq, the latter a Shi'ite Islamist heading the largest Shi'ite party in the country. Neither of these men are the ideal Western-minded cosmopolitans that we would have liked to have seen elected. Hashemi has been downright critical of the postwar democratization process, whereas Hakim's courtship of the West seems more temporary than genuine. Both disagree with each other on the issue of federalism, as well as the nature of constitutionalism.

Yet they have found a commonality in favor of democracy and in opposition both to sectarianism and a return to the former status quo of fraudulent autocracy. Mr. Bush recently met with the two men, and while it remains doubtful that his hour or so with them led to their enlightenment, nevertheless they left Washington by generating rumors that a course change in Iraq is not going to be, as James Baker so wishes it would be, to the detriment of the Iraqi state, but rather in collusion with the Iraqi state. We're about to see a quid pro quo that could quite possibly mean the continued omission of Ba'athism, as well as a fresh exclusion of Shi'ite militiamen loyal to Muqtada al Sadr.

So in a sense, the Hashemi crowd within the Sunni camp must stop speaking of incorporating Ba'athists into the government, but rather must raise the stakes in their opposition to them. And on the other divide, Hakim -- with a long, familial rivalry with Sadr -- must create the political conditions where his Shi'ite coreligionists, like the premier, are powerful enough to shun the Iran-backed pot-belly warlord and get on with the business of governing.

This is not to say reconciliation must be averted. The ragtag Mahdi fighters should be given a choice: abandon Sadr, find a new polity to embrace, give up your arms, and take on new jobs (which must be generated by Baghdad), or be obliterated. Ditto this with Sunni rejectionists, most of which are up in arms due to a feeling of lost prestige as well as fear of Shi'ism. Ba'athism as an institution must never be allowed to exist again as a polity, inasmuch as de-Nazification was appropriate and sustaining. But this process of political exclusion must only deal with the institution-unit of analysis, not the individual. Just as German officers were kept in the ranks but were forced to obey the new political order, so too many ex-Ba'athists must be given the choice by their own Sunni brethren: give up and join, or die. In a sense, political de-Ba'athification was apt, but societal delegitimization of Sunni politics was not. There is something heartening in watching Prime Minister Maliki, a hard-nosed anti-Ba'athist, speaking of forgiveness in regards to low-level former regime elements.

Reconciliation would only work if the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divide evolved into an intrasectarian struggle within both the Sunni and Shi'ite communities. This is a necessary step towards a stable Iraqi administration, which is why, quite unlike the Lebanese who continue to make deals with (and not ostracize) an undemocratic Nasrallah, it is likely to produce greater dipl omatic and political results. You cannot have one foot in government and the other in terrorism. You cannot partake in democratic processes while preaching from the pulpit about the grandeur of brutal theocracy. You cannot be a part of the national fabric while controlling and utilizing your own private mercenary army, backed by fellow ideologues in a nearby state. The "on the brink" civil war is not civil, but regional; not ethnic, but ideological. Incorporating the Shi'ite Sturmabteilung into consensual governance was cancerous.

This is the seminal lesson we learned in Iraq. Our clean three-week liberation turned into an occupation gone haywire under the Coalition Provisional Authority, a body that never should have existed. And from this occupation we called for quick elections which brought to power, in some realms, irresponsible blocs. Our policy instead should have been to transfer political authority and sovereignty over to an interim government immediately, as in Afghanistan. From here, a process of democratization and liberalization should have occurred -- Iraqi-orchestrated, but with our assistance -- until eventual elections were to be held. This would have produced a far more peaceful postbellum environment, as well as a more responsible and technocratic parliament and cabinet in Baghdad. The insurrection would have, perhaps, arisen in another form as it has in the Afghan theater. But this war would have had an Iraqi face on it, with coalitional support from the background as should have been the case. Under these circumstances, fatality frequencies would have been politically acceptable as they were (and are) along the Hindu Kush.

But in our eleventh hour, we can still get this right. We can support this pending process where a new hypothetical bloc is formed to empower Nouri Maliki to tackle the problem or warlordism in the south. We can throw our weight behind this political exclusion, while remaining encouraged by the societal reconciliation of former adherents to the shady Ba'athist and Sadrist movements. The train is leaving the station and these mainly poor, unemployed, angry young men can either join or face the wrath of an enraged Iraqi democracy. Those who partake in violence against their countrymen based along sectarian lines, at the request of Syrian Ba'athists or Iranian mullahs, must not be given a stake in Iraqi governance until they forgo their campaigns.

Various scenarios are in the works, but it seems as if the two major Kurdish parties -- headed by Massoud Barzani and President Talabani -- would team up with Hashemi's Sunnis and Hakim's Shi'ites (as well as various secularists, Iyad Allawi's list, and other minorities) to give the Iraqi premier the political clout to tackle the militia problem. I have been an open supporter of Nouri Maliki, but if he and his Dawa faction view this as a move to undermine or replace him -- therefore not coming on board -- the Iraqi parliament has the sovereign authority to hold a no-confidence vote against him, thus replacing him anyway. Mr. Maliki could very well be unseated in favor of someone like Adil Abdul-Mahdi, the heavyset French-trained economist.

And where are we in all of this? At their side, through think and thin, no matter what the conditions, no matter what the forecast. The most efficient and bloodless way to undermine Ba'athist and Khomeinist insurrectionists across the Iraqi landscape is to politically undermine the Ba'athist assassins in Damascus and the Khomeinist deity-driven clerics in Tehran who provide them with sponsorship and assistance. This means an open declaration of support for Syrian and Iranian dissidents, as well as a proud and unapologetic commitment to Lebanese and Iraqi democrats. Those actively fighting their despots understand what's on the line. By insisting on playing defense in Iraq, and allowing a relatively low-intensity conflict to destroy our morale, I'm not so sure we do.

Nicholas Guariglio writes on the issues of national defense and counterterrorism, specifically regarding Middle East geopolitics. He is a student at the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, where he is studying American foreign policy. He can be contacted at nickguar@comcast.net