There are actually two countries between Iran and Syria. One is Iraq, a land caught between al-Qaeda terrorists and Iranian-supported Shiite extremists. Iraq is a country facing a complex set of challenges, run by imperfect leaders with various agendas, protected by many courageous security forces, hindered by sectarian elements among them. It is a country in which American forces are essential to establishing and securing order and are succeeding in that task. It is a country where there are no easy solutions, but where success is possible if Americans and Iraqis show the necessary determination and skill.

The other country between Iran and Syria might be called "MyRaq." (For this coinage, we are indebted to our friend Joel Rayburn.) This is a different country entirely--a land that exists only in the imaginations of various American political leaders in Washington and in the Green Zone. In MyRaq, the problems are fairly simple and solutions are obvious, although they differ from one MyRaq to another:

* Sunni and Shiite MyRaqis simply hate each other and want to kill each other as they have for centuries. Violence in MyRaq cannot be controlled because it is the reflection of irrational hatred.

* American troops are seen as occupiers in MyRaq. They are the irritant that drives the violence. If only the U.S. withdrew, the MyRaqis would stop killing one another and the war would end.

* MyRaq must find its own solutions to its problems. Real peace can result only from political accommodations that the MyRaqi leaders have so far been unwilling to make, largely because the presence of American forces has allowed them to duck making the hard calls.

* MyRaqis are a bunch of welfare queens who won't do anything for themselves as long as Americans are willing to do it for them. If we want the MyRaqis to establish and maintain security, we've got to pull back and force them to do it. We can leave some training teams to help them work better, but MyRaqi Security Forces should be doing all the heavy lifting in the MyBaghdad Security Plan and throughout the country.

* Problems in MyRaq come from MyRanian (and MySyrian) influence and intervention. MyRan (a fictitious country that deserves a study of its own) is acting out of self-defense in MyRaq, fearful of an overbearing America that refuses to address its legitimate concerns. Diplomatic overtures toward MyRan would reduce MyRanian interference in MyRaq, leading to peace.

* MyRaq is an artificial country whose boundaries have no meaning to its people. It should be partitioned into three states--MyKurdistan, MySunnistan, and MyShiitestan--which would then be peaceful and stable. After all, MyRaq was divided into three vilayets when under Ottoman control and we all know how stable it was then.

Unfortunately, the problems facing Iraq--and their solutions--are far more complex.

The U.S. Role

In Iraq, terrorists and militias are perpetrating sectarian violence, which is not otherwise endemic to modern Iraqi society. Iraqi Sunni and Shiites have lived together for generations, in cities and in rural areas, and have intermarried. Partition will not be possible without the forced movement of hundreds of thousands of people, many of whom do not want to move. And partition would be unstable. Both Sunnis and Shiites believe that they have a right to part of Baghdad. Fighting after partition would be at least as great as it was in 2006, and it would become endemic.

The trouble is not that Iraq's communities hate each other. Rampant violence between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq did not erupt until February 2006, even though Sunni insurgents had been fighting coalition forces for several years and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, had stated his determination to incite sectarian violence in early 2004. He finally succeeded by destroying one of the holiest Shiite mosques. Since then, al-Qaeda and other Sunni extremist groups have targeted the residents of mixed neighborhoods, Shiite neighborhoods, and even purely Sunni neighborhoods. These terrorists have kidnapped and killed innocent Shiites in order to drive Shiite families from their homes alongside Sunni neighbors. Extreme cells of Shiite militias, in turn, have kidnapped and executed Sunni men, women, and children in order to displace residents from the neighborhoods where they have lived intermixed with Shiites.

For this reason, American troops must protect Iraqi civilians from violence, as they are doing now. The al-Qaeda and Shiite militias do not attack each other; they attack each other's innocent populations. Coalition operations to prevent such killings have been successful: Since Operation Enforcing the Law began on February 14, execution-style killings have fallen by two-thirds. American troops and American reconstruction efforts have enabled some markets in Baghdad to reopen, and economic and social life to resume along streets recently occupied by terrorists or militias. For example, significant U.S. forces fought al-Qaeda and other terrorists along Haifa Street in a series of multi-day combats in January 2007. American troops expelled those violent groups and patrol the area regularly. The market around the corner from Haifa Street is now flourishing. Sunnis and Shiites shop there. Their children play alongside the stalls.

American troops now stand not between warring communities, but between innocent Iraqi civilians and violent groups. If America backs off from this effort, the militias will be killing civilians on a larger scale. If America withdraws from Iraq outright, the neighboring states will probably intervene to try to fill the power vacuum. When we visited Iraq recently, one Iraqi general told us, "No true Iraqi citizen wants American forces to leave Iraq. Only terrorists and militias want the Americans to leave."

The Locals Have Their Own Problems

Iraq's leaders face tough problems that concern the survival of their state: how to reform the constitution, how to distribute power among groups, which groups should share in political power, what the rights of the majority and the minority should be. They are making these decisions not in peace and security, but in the crisis of wartime. Iraqi leaders also must develop the power and capacity of their government to provide services and enforce the law, while terrorists and militias actively attempt to undermine the government and destroy Iraq's ailing infrastructure. These problems would be challenges in any system, and even for the greatest and most experienced statesmen.

Experienced statesmen do not run Iraq. The current government took office only one year ago. Almost all of its leaders are new to governing, because the Iraqi constitution prevents the Baath party members who ran Saddam Hussein's bureaucracies from participating in the current government.

Iraqi institutions make resolving these complex problems harder. The current constitution is imperfect. The office of the prime minister lacks power--ministers do not serve at the pleasure of the prime minister as in most parliamentary systems. Nor does the PM control an effective majority in the Council of Representatives, so he cannot move legislation reliably; because of the sectarian distribution of offices, his political opponents operate within the government. Many elected leaders represent narrow sectarian interests, rather than the interests of the majority of the inhabitants of a city or province. Militias respond to a variety of leaders, but the PM does not have a militia of his own; he is handicapped, therefore, in dealing with the fact that others in his government can wield force to their own ends.

Iraq's leaders face pressures from many sides. The American political and military presence prevents the Iraqi government from caving entirely to the pressures of sectarian leaders or collapsing in the face of extensive violence. Far from allowing Iraqi leaders to avoid tough choices, America's military presence helps Iraqi leaders make the hard decisions. A withdrawal of U.S. forces will only leave the government of Iraq vulnerable to militias, terrorists, and aggressive neighbors.

Not Ready Yet

The Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to defend the Iraqi people from sophisticated, well-organized, well-armed enemies. They depend on American forces for logistics, communications, air support, and artillery support. America cannot build these capacities within the Iraqi military overnight. Furthermore, secret cells of Shiite extremists have infiltrated some of the Iraqi security forces and have been kidnapping and killing innocent civilians in order to advance their sectarian agenda. The U.S. has an obligation to protect Iraqis from sectarian killing, while destroying these secret cells, as it has begun to do. Well-led Iraqi forces are assisting the U.S. in its efforts to rid Iraq of the militias preying on the population. Recent operations in Diwaniyah, conducted by the Eighth Iraqi Army Division with the support of U.S. and Polish forces, exemplify the skills of well-trained, non-sectarian Iraqi army units. The Iraqi army is stepping up; but it cannot act alone.

Iran is supplying the most lethal weapons being used against American soldiers: explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), the signature explosive that Shiite militias emplace along roadways to destroy U.S. vehicles and kill U.S. soldiers. Iran is training some Shiite militias and their leaders in Iran and providing advisers to these groups within Iraq. Iran is also training--and perhaps supplying--some Sunni terrorist groups. Iran is thus funding competing militias and political parties.

Diplomatic negotiations between the U.S. and Iran will not solve these problems. Iran has faced a grave strategic threat from Iraq for decades. It is in Iran's interests to foment instability and a weak state in Iraq; or else to exert enough power that Iraq's government serves Iran's interests; or else actually to gain enough military power to overwhelm Iraq and other states in the region. America's interests are exactly contrary to Iran's. There is little room for compromise. And there is no reason for Iran to compromise as long as American defeat in Iraq appears possible. The U.S. will continue to lack leverage with which to negotiate until we have succeeded in Iraq and restored some measure of balance to the region.

America can still succeed in Iraq. Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups have attempted to terrorize Iraq's Sunni population into supporting their extremist interpretation of Islam. Most Sunni communities in Iraq have rejected this. In Anbar province, where the Sunni insurgency flourished from 2003 to 2006, tribal sheiks are expelling al-Qaeda. Their sons are joining the Iraqi security forces by the thousands. The anti-al-Qaeda movement is spreading into other Sunni provinces, such as Salah-ad-Din, and into mixed provinces, such as Diyala. American forces are helping the government of Iraq provide services, such as fuel distribution, to these areas. American forces are helping these communities secure themselves. American forces are establishing local governments. American forces are trying to establish a system of provincial elections that will give the Sunnis a share of power and a chance to participate in governing Iraq.

American political leaders must formulate policies based on ground truth, not on their imaginations. MyRaq is a fantasy land. It requires no complex intelligence system to understand--reality in MyRaq is whatever we say it is. Iraq, on the other hand, is real, filled with people and problems too complex to legislate from 6,000 miles away. American policymakers must debate and discuss the situation as it is. This debate requires a sophisticated and sustained effort to understand the actual situation in Iraq. There are no simple solutions to the problems in Iraq. America's presence advances, though it does not guarantee, the creation of a stable government for all Iraqis. America's presence prevents widespread sectarian cleansing. America's presence gives the Iraqi government an opportunity to grow in capacity and resolve political problems peacefully. Time, patience, and the establishment of security lay the groundwork for complex political negotiations and compromises. Setting timelines or withdrawing American forces will not pressure Iraqis to make tough decisions. It will guarantee failure.

Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at AEI. Kimberly Kagan is executive director of the Institute for the Study of War.

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