The brilliant LT General David Petraeus—a graduate of West Point who holds an M.P.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton University—has a profound understanding of the insurgency in Iraq. FSM Contributing Editor James Forest, Ph.D., Associate Professor at West Point and Director of Terrorist Studies at the Combating Terrorism Center., reveals Petraeus’s grasp of the global conflict of ideologies in this fascinating account of this extraordinary man.

Iraq is a mess. The good news is that of all the military leaders this administration could choose to tackle the complexities in Iraq, few would be as perfect for the task as Lieutenant General (LTG) David Petraeus. He commanded the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Iraq during the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and led the team that successfully pacified and reconstructed the northern city of Mosul. At one point during this period, a group of West Point faculty (including myself) were treated to a conference call with Petraeus, who described the vast diversity of their civil affairs efforts, and I was struck by his incredible grasp of critical infrastructure challenges, local cultural nuances, and the non-kinetic dimensions of effective counterinsurgency. He and his team demonstrated the political savvy of the best mayoral administrations in the U.S., and their results of their efforts spoke volumes. We brought his observations and lessons learned from the field into our classrooms, where our cadets—Army officers of the future—surely benefited.

In June 2004, he became the first commander of the Multi-National Security Transition-Iraq, and later that year was chosen as the first commander of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq. His leadership and experience are unquestioned. But it his impressive intellect and enormous grasp of the non-kinetic aspects of military conflicts which will be of greatest assistance to our men and women deployed in Iraq. You see, LTG Petraeus is one of a rare breed of senior scholar-soldiers who knows—and can convince others, drawing on extensive historical facts and solid academic theory—that military power of even the greatest magnitude cannot resolve a complex counterinsurgency on its own.

For example, in the January-February 2006 issue of Military Review, Petraeus offered fourteen observations from his experiences in Iraq. This article has become required reading in several military education programs, and warrants a brief summary and paraphrasing for a broader audience, particular as it relates the application of soft power toward countering insurgencies. These observations are:

1.“Do not try to do too much with your own hands.”
2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life.
3. Money is ammunition.
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success.
5. Analyze “costs and benefits” before each operation.
6. Intelligence is the key to success.
7. Everyone must do nation-building.
8. Help build institutions, not just units.
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier.
10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations.
11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders.
12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants.
13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.
14. A leader’s most important task is to set the right tone.

Observations 7 through 11 are particular important for our understanding of how the Iraq conflict will (if ever) be resolved, because they emphasize the non-military, soft power dimensions of any successful counterinsurgency strategy. Indeed, his observation number 10, that success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations, raises critical questions about why the military continues to bear the overwhelming brunt of the current counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. The Departments of States, Agriculture, Education, Energy—all the arms of the federal government should be heavily engaged in the reconstruction process, through financial and human resource commitments. In their absence, military officers and their soldiers are tasked with the broadest array of civil affairs, construction, and development projects imaginable, projects which are absolutely necessary for rebuilding a nation torn apart by decades of corrupt dictatorship and, more recently, war and sectarian violence.

According to Joseph Nye, dean of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, the term soft power encompasses the realm of economics as well as the nuanced world of negotiated relationships among nations and transnational actors (like multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and multinational regimes like NATO, the European Union, and OPEC). It also accounts for the non-warfighting, nation-building activities that our soldiers and officers conduct on a daily basis (but which almost never receive coverage in the media). Under Petraeus, these types of activities became a responsibility of everyone, not just the Civil Affairs units. For example, he tells the story (in his Military Review article) of how reopening the University of Mosul demonstrates the importance of soft power. After assessing the extent of the damage and looting, he organized a combination of civil affairs and aviation brigade personnel (individuals who clearly did not have “Rebuild Foreign Academic Institutions” in their mission essential task list), and put them to work repairing and reopen this symbol of considerable national pride, with over 75 buildings, some 4,500 staff and faculty, and approximately 30-35,000 students.

LTG Petraeus also sent his Signal Battalion to help reestablish the local telecommunications structure. Their work including assisting the Ministry of Telecommunications element in northern Iraq with a deal that brought a satellite downlink to the central switch and linked Mosul with the international phone system. Other components of his division were assigned similar tasks. The Chaplain and his team linked with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Engineer Battalion with the Ministry of Public Works, the Division Support Command with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Corps Support Group with the Ministry of Education, the Military Police Battalion with the Ministry of Interior (Police), the Surgeon and his team with the Ministry of Health, the Staff Judge Advocate with Ministry of Justice officials, the Fire Support Element with the Ministry of Oil, and so on. At the end of the day, everyone and every element, not just Civil Affairs units, was engaged in nation-building. The results among the community were palpable—Mosul remained one of the most peaceful areas in Iraq throughout Petraeus’ command.

According to Petraeus, counterinsurgency strategies must include “above all, efforts to establish a political environment that helps reduce support for the insurgents and undermines the attraction of whatever ideology they may espouse. In certain Sunni Arab regions of Iraq, establishing such a political environment is likely of greater importance than military operations, since the right political initiatives might undermine the sanctuary and assistance provided to the insurgents. Beyond the political arena, other important factors are economic recovery (which reduces unemployment, a serious challenge in Iraq that leads some out-of-work Iraqis to be guns for hire), education (which opens up employment possibilities and access to information from outside one’s normal circles), diplomatic initiatives (in particular, working with neighboring states through which foreign fighters transit), improvement in the provision of basic services, and so on. In fact, the campaign plan developed in 2005 by the Multinational Force-Iraq and the U.S. Embassy with Iraqi and Coalition leaders addresses each of these issues.” (Of course, an immediate question that his observation reveals is why there was no comparable plan to address these issues before the original invasion of Iraq in March 2003.)

In his Military Review article, Petraeus describes how his team saw beyond the need to develop Iraqi Army and Police units, and began working as well to rebuild the institutions that support these units in the field—the ministries, the administrative and logistical support units, the professional military education systems, admin policies and procedures, and the training organizations. “A lack of ministry capability and capacity,” he notes, “can undermine the development of the battalions, brigades, and divisions, if the ministries, for example, don’t pay the soldiers or police on time, use political rather than professional criteria in picking leaders, or fail to pay contractors as required for services provided.”

In addition, he notes, understanding key cultural aspects—the viewpoints of various ethnic groups, tribes, religious elements, political parties, and other social groupings; the relationships among the various groups; governmental structures and processes; local and regional history; and, of course, local and national leaders—is essential if one is to help the people build stable political, social, and economic institutions. Beyond the intellectual need for the specific knowledge about the environment in which one is working, it is also clear that people, in general, are more likely to cooperate if those who have power over them respect the culture that gives them a sense of identity and self-worth. These observations reflect the sort of understanding about human behavior and commitment to cultural awareness that have provided (and will continue to provide) an important beacon for guiding his subordinates toward success in Iraq.

Finally, he emphasizes the critical importance of local leadership in forging a successful future in Iraq. “Success in Iraq is, as time passes, increasingly dependent on Iraqi leaders—at four levels:

– Leaders at the national level working together, reaching across party and sectarian lines to keep the country unified, rejecting short-term expedient solutions such as the use of militias, and pursuing initiatives to give more of a stake in the success of the new Iraq to those who feel left out;

– Leaders in the ministries building the capability and capacity necessary to use the tremendous resources Iraq has efficiently, transparently, honestly, and effectively;

– Leaders at the province level resisting temptations to pursue winner-take-all politics and resisting the urge to politicize the local police and other security forces, and;

– Leaders in the Security Forces staying out of politics, providing courageous, competent leadership to their units, implementing policies that are fair to all members of their forces, and fostering loyalty to their Army or Police band of brothers rather than to specific tribes, ethnic groups, political parties, or local militias. Iraqi leaders are, in short, the real key to the new Iraq, and we thus need to continue to do all that we can to enable them.”

This last point—enabling the Iraqi people to take control of their country and build a prosperous democracy—is an oft-cited mantra of the current administration, and yet highlights the debate about sending more troops to Iraq to quell the violence. The Bush administration has (perhaps belatedly) recognized that before soft power can be applied to build a stable democracy, absolute security must be provided, and this requires a greater force presence than initially approved. However, critics are loathe to see the U.S. bear the brunt of the responsibility for providing this security. A professional Iraqi military and police force, whose members are loyal only to the nation’s constitution and laws (and willing to abandon their historical ethnic or tribal influences), is paramount to the security of the country. To the degree that this proposed surge in troop strength can enable such developments, it is a good thing, but it remains to be seen—despite the huge sacrifices being made every day by the men and women (many of them fathers and mothers) of the American armed forces—whether the Iraqi people will rise to the occasion. This may very well be their last, best chance to prove the critics and skeptics wrong.

Overall, LTG David Petraeus—a graduate of West Point who happens to hold a M.P.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton University—has a profound understanding that the military is not the solution to an insurgency. He, perhaps more than most senior officers and civilian leaders in this administration, has demonstrated his grasp of the global conflict of ideologies, and seems to offer a pragmatic, comprehensive response to the Iraqi stage on which the conflict is being played out. We will undoubtedly give him our full support. So should the people of Iraq.

Acknowledgements

The views expressed are those of the author and not of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Military Academy, or any other agency ofthe U.S. Government.  FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor James Forest, Ph.D., is Associate Professor at the United States Military Academy, West Point, and Director of Terrorist Studies at the Combating Terrorism Center.