Ryan
Mauro's
|
Assad: Mullahs have him by short hairs This article originally appeared in the New York Post By Amir Taheri November 6, 2006 WHILE there is much talk
of continued Syrian machinations in Lebanon , little attention is paid to
an Iranian plan to remodel Syria into a Khomeinist state. The Tehran-Damascus axis was first formed in 1980, when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. They seemed unlikely allies: Iran's Khomeinists followed a radical Shiite ideology aimed at global holy war; Syria's Ba'athists were secularists, inspired by an Arabized version of National Socialism, aimed at uniting Arab countries under one flag and one party. Yet the Syrians knew that, if Saddam won, he'd become the unrivalled Arab supremo, marginalizing and eventually toppling theirregime. The mullahs knew that only Syria could prevent a unified Arab bloc to back Saddam. All along, however, Syrian
President Hafez al-Assad was careful not to be totally hooked to Iran . He
met every U.S. president and maintained close contact with Washington . He
was also ruthless when it came to Islamist tendencies, even if that meant
massacring thousands of people. When the two joined in sponsoring the
Lebanese branch of Hezbollah in 1982, Assad insisted on having his own
Lebanonese Shiite outlet in the form of Nabih Berri's Amal Movement.
Yet today there are signs that the Islamic Republic is determined to export its ideology to Syria. Tehran believes that only an Islamicized Syria would be a dependable ally in driving America out of the Middle East, wiping Israel off the map and creating a new Islamic "superpower" with Iran as its core. Phase one was last year's campaign to cast suspicion on elements in the Syrian Ba'ath known for opposing Khomeinism. Hundreds of Ba'athist cadres, including senior figures, were retired or driven into exile.
Yet President Bashar al-Assad's purge has increased his vulnerability to conspiracies by the excluded cadres. Some of these have allied with the regime's opponents - increasing Assad's reliance on Iranian security. Sources in Damascus claim that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah have assigned special units to protect Assad against any domestic enemies. Tehran has also succeeded in killing "the American temptation" in Damascus . That "temptation" came to the fore in 2003, when Assad surrounded himself with Western-educated technocrats and diplomats who wanted him to switch to the U.S. side in the wake of regime change in Baghdad. Since then, however, such Syrian officials have been silenced or forced to change tune. Tehran has successfully peddled the fear that Syria may be a target for American "regime change." Also forcing Syria closer to Iran was the 2005 murder of former Lebanese Premier Rafiq Hariri - widely thought Syria 's work. This destroyed bridges between Damascus and moderate Arab capitals. Hardly a single Arab regime is prepared to maintain friendly ties with Syria , let alone prop up the Assad regime. The more isolated Syria becomes, the more its leaders are forced to depend on Iran . Last June, Syria did what it had not done even during its Soviet alliance, and signed a defence pact with the Islamic Republic. Among much else, this gives Iran direct access to Syria 's military at middle and senior levels. One result pact has been a fourfold increase in the number of Iranian military and security personnel in Syria.
The Assad regime is a typical Arab set-up, unable to survive without the backing of an outside power. For a brief moment in 2003-04, it looked as if Americfa could provide that backing. Since then, Assad has been left with no option but putting himself under Iranian protection. That, in turn, makes a showdown between America and the Islamic Republic that much more possible.
|