By PETER BERGEN
Washington
THE French saying, often attributed to Talleyrand, that
“this is worse than a crime, it’s a blunder,” could easily describe
America’s invasion of Iraq. But for the United States to pull entirely out
of that country right now, as is being demanded by a growing chorus of
critics, would be to snatch an unqualified disaster from the jaws of an
enormous blunder.
To understand why, look to history. Vietnam often looms
large in the debate over Iraq, but the better analogy is what happened in
Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion. During the 1980’s, Washington
poured billions of dollars into the Afghan resistance. Around the time of
Moscow’s withdrawal in 1989, however, the United States shut its embassy
in Kabul and largely ignored the ensuing civil war and the rise of the
Taliban and its Qaeda allies. We can’t make the same mistake again in
Iraq.
A total withdrawal from Iraq would play into the hands of
the jihadist terrorists. As Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri,
made clear shortly after 9/11 in his book “Knights Under the Prophet’s
Banner,” Al Qaeda’s most important short-term strategic goal is to seize
control of a state, or part of a state, somewhere in the Muslim world.
“Confronting the enemies of Islam and launching jihad against them require
a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land,” he wrote. “Without
achieving this goal our actions will mean nothing.” Such a jihadist state
would be the ideal launching pad for future attacks on the West.
And there is no riper spot than the Sunni-majority areas of
central and western Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — the most feared insurgent
commander in Iraq — was issuing an invitation to Mr. bin Laden when he
named his group Al Qaeda in Iraq. When Mr. Zarqawi was killed this year,
his successor, Abu Hamza al-Muhajer, also swore allegiance to Al Qaeda’s
chief.
Another problem with a total American withdrawal is that it
would fit all too neatly into Osama bin Laden’s master narrative about
American foreign policy. His theme is that America is a paper tiger that
cannot tolerate body bags coming home; to back it up, he cites President
Ronald Reagan’s 1984 withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and
President Bill Clinton’s decision nearly a decade later to pull troops
from Somalia. A unilateral pullout from Iraq would only confirm this
analysis of American weakness among his jihadist allies.
Indeed, in 2005 Mr. Zawahri sent Mr. Zarqawi a letter, which
was intercepted by the United States military, exhorting him to start
preparing for the impending American withdrawal similar to that of Vietnam
30 years ago. “The aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam
— and how they ran and left their agents — is noteworthy,” Mr. Zawahri
said. “Because of that, we must be ready starting now, before events
overtake us, and before we are surprised by the conspiracies of the
Americans and the United Nations and their plans to fill the void behind
them.”
Yes, there is little doubt that the botched American
occupation of Iraq was the critical factor that fueled the Iraqi
insurgency. But for the United States to wash its hands of the country now
would give Al Qaeda’s leaders what they want.
This does not mean simply holding course. America should
abandon its pretensions that it can make Iraq a functioning democracy and
halt the civil war. Instead, we should focus on a minimalist definition of
our interests in Iraq, which is to prevent a militant Sunni jihadist
mini-state from emerging and allowing Al Qaeda to regroup.
While withdrawing a substantial number of American troops
from Iraq would probably tamp down the insurgency and should be done as
soon as is possible, a significant force must remain in Iraq for many
years to destroy Al Qaeda in Iraq.
That can be accomplished by making the American presence
less visible; withdrawing American troops to bases in central and western
Iraq; and relying on contingents of Special Forces to hunt militants. To
do otherwise would be to ignore the lessons of history, lessons that Al
Qaeda’s leaders certainly haven’t forgotten.
Peter Bergen, a senior fellow of the New America
Foundation, is the author of “The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History
of Al Qaeda’s Leader.”