The psychological pendulum in Iraq is swinging yet again. Given this is our eleventh our, it could not come at a better time. We are in a race of sorts; not only a race to connect the Middle East to the rest of the world before primordialists disconnect it, or a race to crush a resurgent Taliban, to win over the tribal loyalists of Sunni sheikhs in Anbar, to provide security for residents of Sadr City, or to undercut Iranian schemes before their nuclearization. Our race also hinders on coy presidential hopefuls, already in full-swing campaign mode, and a Congress that first demands for a change in strategy, moans about that change, but remains politically wise (and cynical) enough to wait, watch, and listen -- lest, God forbid, Petraeus pulls a Sherman, pacifies Baghdad, and wins the war -- in which case they can claim it was their opposition all along that brought the successful course change and favorable outcome.

Sympathies must go out to the genuine Iraqi reformers and heroes in the government and armed forces, alongside of course our soldiers, commanders, and diplomats, which are doing everything they can -- in the face of geopolitics, domestic politics, tribalism, triangulation, regional conflicts, sectarian spats, theology, and Arab and Persian history -- to make this work, while the Peanut Gallery looks on from afar with scorn for supposedly misguided idealism. As the weeks go by, the importance of creating new political realities on the ground in Iraq cannot be overstated. We often hear that there is no military solution in Iraq. This is partly true, partly untrue.

There is in fact a political resolution in intra-Iraqi affairs but this exposes the two obvious points of rebuttal: not all Iraqi affairs are internal (never deny the regional aspects of this war) and only a secure and stabilized situation, in the aftermath of a considerable military defeat against the insurrectionists, can create conditions congruent with political compromise. Militarily, the coalition and Iraqi forces hold a clear-cut superiority. It is rather the processes of reconciliation and political accommodation which the jihadist and militant movements exploit to further degenerate Iraq into sectarianism and apathy. The only way to counter this is to recreate polities which offer Iraqi constituencies and the electorate another alternative; a way out of their current quandary through peaceful means.

< br>Which is where Iyad Allawi comes in.

Last week I had emailed Dr. Allawi, the former interim premier of Iraq, to see if he would be willing to answer a few questions. A couple hours later one of his associates at the Iraqi National Accord wrote back explaining that he was no longer in the West, but had traveled back to Baghdad and would be unable to have a talk for some time. What was this? The supposedly discredited, out-of-touch U.S. puppet was in Baghdad? Hadn't his party suffered substantial defeat in the transitional and parliamentary Iraqi elections? Hadn't nonsectarian politics been etched in stone as a far-fetched alternative?

I have never bought that argument. One cannot insist on a political solution in Iraq and then reject political maneuvering in order to hedge against "political instability." That is nonsense. If there is one thing we have learned in our entire Iraqi experience, it is to insist that those who claim to be antithetical to reconciliation and unity government are not begged to join reconciliation processes in order to form unity governments. It is strikingly clear that this should be widely acknowledged. Those that partake in sectarianism and sabotage, on the orders of their payroll masters in Tehran, Damascus, and Riyadh, ought not to be welcomed into a cabinet they are trying to assassinate and overthrow. We see this daily with Hezbollah in Beirut and we see it with autocratic Sunnis and the Sadrists in Iraq.

In our four years in Iraq we have seen four leaders, each serving approximately a year as proconsul or premier: Paul Bremer (2003-2004) as chief of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iyad Allawi (2004-2005) as interim leader, Ibrahim Jaafari (2005-2006) as the transitional prime minister, and finally Nouri Maliki as the current premier. Bremer made countless errors, but in all fairness it wasn't so much him as it was the position itself; sovereignty to the Iraqis should have been transferred over to them immediately. Jaafari did not have the political support of Sunnis who ignored the transitional elections. Maliki currently is too dependent on political support from militiamen.

All are good and decent men, putting their lives and reputations at risk, and each has had their fair share of goof-ups and unfortunate political dependencies. But it was Allawi, who, in his short time in office, showcased what I believe to be the most serious and well-defined counterinsurgency doctrine and national reconciliation strategy.

< br>The templates to look at would be the Fallujah and Najaf crackdowns in 2004 which Allawi himself authorized. Dr. Allawi, who has garnered a reputation as a democratic strongman -- a hydra-headed authoritative liberal, so to speak -- created this name due to folk stories of his watching (and participating) in the impromptu execution of insurgents. Such bullishness is looked upon with amusement and even, dare I say, nostalgia, by Iraqis who remain restless due to the continued dearth of security. This dual strategy, employed in Najaf and Fallujah, is to suppress rebel insurrectionists and jihadists of all stripes and sects, and then to offer political olive branches to those defeated hooligans that reject violence. Just as Karzai finds himself triangulating with warlords in Afghanistan, Allawi realized in 2004 that only after agreeing upon the new parameters of a democratic Iraq should the native opponents of the new Iraq be allowed to join the political fray. This means targeting all assassins and revanchists, both Sunni and Shi'ite alike.

That strategy seems to be making a comeback. What does this mean for the current Iraqi leadership? It had been initially thought that a shift in the Iraqi body politic would be done to empower the ruling Maliki coalition. This has not happened. Although Mr. Maliki shuffles his cabinet and welcomes unity governance, he has not addressed the issue of excluding undemocratic polities (which are now included) and including disenfranchised individuals (which are now excluded). Allawi is a secularist and nonsectarian, yet he holds the unusual title of both Shi'ite and ex-Ba'athist. We must remember that de-Ba'athification, like de-Nazification in postwar Germany, ought to have remained solely at the party level. The problem vis-à-vis the Sunni-Shi'ite divide -- other than the obvious interference of the Iranians and Syrians -- is the complete opposite for each polity: Iraqi Sunni leaders like Vice President Hashemi must bring in ex-Ba'athist persons without championing Ba'athism, whereas Iraqi Shi'ite leaders must gently push out Sadrist theocracy without abandoning otherwise good Shi'ite individuals.

Can Nouri Maliki be the one to pull this off? He now has the time and space to attempt to do so, security-wise. But his bloc is not grabbing this torch of opportunity and running with it, hence the reemergence of Allawi. Iraqi newspapers such as al-Mada, Az-Zaman, and As-Sabah al Jadeed are already buzzing over the possibility of Allawi and a nonsectarian parliamentary bloc coming to power. The Al Fadhila party, a Shi'ite Islamist group, has withdrawn from the United Iraqi Alliance, leaving SCIRI and Dawa without their parliamentary backing. Al Fadhila's spokesmen talked to Iraqi journalists of "escaping sectarianism," joining a "patriotic project," which will be "trans-sectarian" in its nature.

< br> Photos of Dr. Allawi laughing it up with prominent Sunnis, Vice President Hashemi and MP Adnan al Dulaimi amongst them, and news that he is consolidating support from secularists, making the rounds with the two Kurdish parties, and luring Shi'ite parties like Al Fadhila away from the largest Shi'a bloc are interesting to say the least. Just as there was a split between indigenous Sunnis in Anbar, which turned on the foreign Wahhabis, so too we must work, in the aftermath of this security crackdown in Baghdad, for that "political solution" everyone speaks so highly of. And this means not rejecting political solutions once their wheels are in motion.

Never should the United States favor any one particular politician over another in Iraq. But we most certainly should lay out what our objectives for Iraq are -- unity, reconciliation, democratization, constitutionalism, parliamentarianism, and antiterrorism -- and should support the polities, whatever their sect may be, that humbly agree with these principles. Most Iraqi people are good at heart, and given the propensity of their neighbors to intermingle, warlords and militiamen promising safety, the threat of terrorist nihilist violence, a return to autocracy, the possibility of theocracy, and so forth, they have largely handled themselves with grace under pressure.

Blunt, tough, and nonsectarian Iraqi leadership is a much needed commodity. Nouri Maliki has been dealt a difficult hand of cards; he has even stated he would never take the job of prime minister again. If he cannot (or will not) survive the changing Iraqi political landscape, with the possibility of a new and consensual party bloc emerging, he may not be the man for the job.