Let's begin with a modest assessment: it has been a bad summer for the bad guys. It started with the assassination of al Qaida linchpin Abu Musab al Zarqawi, which happened to ceremoniously fall on the same day that the permanent Iraqi government was at last formed. Found in the rubble of the slain terrorist's safehouse was a treasure trove of information that led to the arrest of his top associates: Hamzi al Aini, Ahmed al Battawi, and Abbas al Mufraji are no longer with us. The mastermind of the Beslan school siege, Shamil Basayev, was killed a few weeks later. Taliban insurrectionists have finally and thankfully crawled out of their caves -- and exposed themselves to die dozens at a time. A teary-eyed Hussein is now speaking openly about what form of execution he desires.

On the other side of the world, in East Asia, the despots in North Korea thought their successful missile test would bring them carrots, not sticks. They were wrong. Not only was their test unsuccessful -- and by default humiliating -- but they earned neither the aura of deterrence nor the economic "sun shine" goodies they believed they'd receive.

There is no doubt that, thus far, this season has not been kind to rogues and fascists, which seem to have overplayed their cards. Ethnic cleansing still continues in Darfur, windfall oil profits still manage to fund bad men doing bad things, Baghdad still burns, Somalia just went Salafi, and old man Fidel is not yet quite dead, but nonetheless, wherever you look, we see oppressive societies stupidly lashing out to the world with varying degrees of failure and international retribution.

But none of these errors can compare to that of Tehran's premature proxy wars. It is unclear how much the Iranian mullahcracy knew about the recent escapades of Hamas and Hezbollah. But what remains clear is that (if the world responds appropriately) the ruling clerics in Iran have the most to lose. Their swan song began a few months ago, starting with the new Iraqi premier, Mr. Maliki, who, contrary to what the mullahs had hoped, is more Iraqi than Shi'ite, more nationalist than theologian. All militias within Iraq -- especially the Iranian-backed Mahdi militia -- will be dismantled, through peace or violence, during Maliki's tenure.

Iran is slowly but surely losing strategic access to its clientele. In this most recent flare-up of violence, the usual international condemnations of Israel have of course occurred, but so has denunciation of Hezbollah from the Jordanian, Egyptian, Saudi, and Iraqi governments. Whether it is Arab fears of Persian expansionism or Sunni trepidations over Khomeinist pathology, the usual orthodoxy no longer applies. Ahmadinejad's instrumentalities, specifically Hezbollah, are rapidly entering the days of their impotence -- if not the twilight of their existence, altogether.

< br> In many ways, Hezbollah emir Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah will end up a tragic figure. Much like Yamamoto's post facto admission that Imperial Japan had made a fateful error at Pearl Harbor -- "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve" -- it is relatively unsurprising to hear Hezbollah leaders claim they miscalculated Israeli retaliation to the kidnapping of their soldiers.

Mahmoud Komati, a deputy chief in Hezbollah, recently mumbled to the Associated Press, "The truth is… we didn't even expect (this) response." He went on to explain that he and his Hezbollah masters expected "the usual, limited response" from Israel -- perhaps sending in commandos to try and rescue the kidnapped Israelis, or using a third-party like Germany as a mediator for a prisoner exchange.

How mind-numbingly stupid. So often we hear analysts reminding us that, for the jihadists, a defeat is really a victory (and a victory is a victory, too, of course). We're told we misunderstand the ideological domain with which "the other" wages war: kill a terrorist and you create a martyr, fail to kill him and you create a mythical legend.

But what are we to make of the persistent misunderstanding, and misjudging, from Eastern adversaries of our sacred Western way of war? Were they truly unaware that self-governed peoples hold their parliaments accountable to uphold their sovereignty? Have they not studied the tactics and generalship of a Sherman or a Patton? Were they unlearned of shock-battle so often employed by the Western adherents of Greco-Roman battlefield doctrine, and so often ignored by their disorganized, soon-to-be-obliterated opponents? Do they not teach multiculturalism in the Bekaa Valley?

< br> Whatever their excuse, the fact remains Hezbollah has utterly failed the people of Lebanon. Not only have they not delivered on fulfilling their bogus promise of Islamist ecstasy, but now they have plunged a relatively benign population into a war in a manner that showcases their scorn for their own people. There was no parliamentary approval in Lebanon for this conflict. The prime minister did not extend his support. The people were not informed. Attacking the Israelis was not up for a referendum.

What we saw a few weeks ago was unilateralism -- a morally neutral concept, in and of itself -- at its worst. No one in Beirut could have predicted the wrath from above that would rain down upon them. They were in the dark, unknowing of what the armed jihadist enclave in the Bekaa Valley was scheming. And now they are knowledgeable, and however much they oppose Israeli airstrikes over their heads -- and however much they claim to support "the resistance" Hezbollah -- it will be they, the Lebanese, who will put this hooligan fascist movement out of business once and for all.

You see, unlike the rather unintelligent and historically ignorant Hezbollah superiors, we in the West -- and the Israelis above all -- are well informed on the Eastern, and far less lethal, way of war. However scary black pajama-wearing jihadists are as they saw off someone's neck, their decapitation movie productions are not as devastating as an enraged democracy at war. Some ninety-percent of the Israelis support the bombardment of Lebanon -- and are unimpressed with the lack of efficiency in Hezbollah's rocket launches.

< br> Time and again nasty autocrats and terrorists believe they can play this silly gambit. The logic behind their madness is parasitic and goes something like the following: we in the liberal, prosperous West have the good life and they in their statist despotism do not; therefore we cannot endure an irritating, and perhaps bloody, interruption from our beach houses and BBQs, and they can. In a sense, they, the Hamas and Hezbollah trash, know they have nothing left to lose and are confidant the Israelis, having everything to lose, do not want to upset the status quo of their happy summer holiday.

This is how fascists operate. This is why some of the most multiracial, multicultural, and enlightened pacifistic societies on the planet, like Denmark, are bullied into submission over cartoon scribblings that the theocrats in their theocracies disapprove of. This is why someone critical of literalist Islamist interpretations -- and what that means for Muslim women -- like Ms. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, can be forced into exile to avoid the perverse retribution of genital mutilation.

Whenever there is a peace accord or an obviously fair concession that should be a mutual agreement, the totalitarians must at once make war. Dictatorial regimes need external enemies to maintain internal vulnerability and absolute power. How else do we explain Mr. Arafat's refusal of almost all of the West Bank -- and his calling for another terrorist intifada? With the Israeli withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon, the modus operandi for each terror group vanished. Yet, like the warlord Muqtada al Sadr in Iraq, each group boasted of their "anti-corruption" platforms, and ran in parliamentary elections that, if they had completely won, they would have shut down at the moment of their ascension.

< br> In the end, Hamas -- unable to do much of anything for the Palestinians -- will most likely crumble on their own. They have bitten the hand that feeds them one too many times, and those evil Jews may no longer give them the chemotherapy, dialyses, prenatal care, electricity, paychecks, and foreign direct investment that makes their Gaza slums a little less slummy.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, will have a lack of bases to assemble at, a lack of camps to train in, a lack of fortifications to operate from, and a lack of leaders to lead. Much like the de-Nazification and de-Ba'athification processes that occurred in postwar Germany and postbellum Iraq, there must be a period of de-Hezbollahization in Lebanon. No terrorist group ought to be allowed to have a political wing -- or an armed militia operating outside of the control of a sovereign parliament.

We do not yet know how this Lebanese conflict will play out in the end. But one thing is clear: Hezbollah will change, for the worse, far more than Israel. And that will be a detriment to Iran more than anyone else. Doing this, however, will not primarily be an Israeli mission. The current air offensive in Lebanon is the equivalent -- both strategically and in terms of timetables -- of the American assault over Afghanistan in late 2001.