What a Jacksonian representative Mr. Bush has proved to be. Old Hickory, convinced that the laws of politics did not apply to him, was in no way, shape, or form a conventional politico. And here today, with bipartisan support for the Iraq Study Group's capitulationism, a sweeping change to a Democratic polity, juvenile disdain for Iraqis coming from the mouth of media playboy darling Sen. Obama, and unrelenting domestic rebellion of his policy, George Bush has revived President Jackson's contrarian form of obscure but domineering statesmanship. It could not have come at a more appropriate time.

For all its faults, for all the mistakes and blunders that should have been foreseen -- and God knows there are many -- never has this administration forgone the basic principality that states the following: Islamist fanaticism is a puritanical cult-like phenomena, for which a tolerant and liberal Western world is not at fault. Rather, this bizarre pathology is a reaction to the far more humanitarian ethos of encroaching modernity and globalization. We are not at fault for the killers, nor are we at fault for killing the killers. The cause of terrorism is not our resistance against it.

Sometimes much needed introspection has a peculiar way of morphing into misguided scornful self-loathing. Not once has Mr. Bush or members of his cabinet conceded to this false pretense. Our great historical mistake, however, has long been recognized by this Bushian cartel: tolerance of Arab autocracies like the Mubarak dynasty, the Saudi royals, the Assad family, Hussein & Sons, Inc., etc., had created conditions where the masses of the Middle East loathed a United States seemingly uninterested in their repression. Decades of this nonchalance allowed parasitic theocrats in the form of Ayatollah Khomeini and Dr. al Zawahiri, for two examples, to theologically enslave and ideologically hijack large portions of the subcontinent.

This so-called Long War is about flipping that equation.

Only in Washington can so much change so quickly in so little time. Just a few weeks ago, coming off electoral defeat, the administration's war minister was forced into premature retirement (to my dismay). James Baker seemed to be the prominent voice arising from the midst with his usual suggestions of chatting with fascists and tyrants of all stripes; now it seems his pseudo brilliant proposals are as ostracized as we can only hope Mr. Baker himself will forever be. Defense chief Robert Gates was seen as a patron of the realist "wheel and deal" league; now he admits "none of those conditions (for negotiating with Iran bilaterally) apply any longer."

I extend my apologies to Secretary Gates for the harsh, and now seemingly premature, critique of his positions in the wake of his nomination. If his pragmatist past has any benefit, it is its flexibility and ability to adapt and realize that the paradigm has changed. Alas, Bob Gates, a long-time advocate of negotiation with the mullahs, now concedes Iran is the primary problem in Iraq. We can only hope his epiphany is indicative of a larger awakening inside the Oval Office. Just as we found it necessary to deal first with Aguinaldo prior to crushing the rebellious Moro insurrection in the Philippines at the turn of the last century, so too we are coming to the (correct) conclusion that the Iraqi guerrilla war underway is not only unfinished business with ex-Ba'athists, but the epicenter of a regional war both between warring opponents as well as in collusion against Western globalization -- and all of the Arab and Persian reformers and constitutionalists that side with us.

When a moderate Shi'ite parliamentarian in Baghdad comes home to find his wife and children slaughtered by Iranian-backed death squads, when Syrian and Iranian clients slay Lebanese journalists like Samir Kasser and Gebran Tueni, when militiamen on pickup roam Mogadishu and kill nuns and moviegoers with weapons sold by Damascus, Riyadh, and Tehran… this is all part of the same regional war between the forces of connectedness and the adherents of disconnectedness. This is not a conflict we can withdraw from, however hard we may try. It is not going away.

Which brings us to the pending force buildup in both the Iraqi and Afghan theaters. For some time the fear was sending more troops to these war zones would only increase Iraqi and Afghan dependency. The correct formula, as General Casey and Donald Rumsfeld saw it, was to enhance indigenous capabilities to wage counterinsurgency operations themselves. That was our stated endgame; that was the exit strategy. This is in fact the correct long-term prescription for Iraq and Afghanistan, but here's the rub: neither we nor our Iraqi and Afghan allies have the time or political will to wait that long. Both conflicts are reaching a tipping point, and given that they both are smaller confrontations in the larger regional clash, a change in the rules of engagement, as well as a force buildup, is necessary. Unless these additional brigades are allowed to disrupt the Mahdi militia in Iraq and cross into Pakistani territory to destroy fleeing al Qaidists, their role on the battlefield will be stifled.

This surge in Iraq is not about Iraq; it is, and always was about, countering Iran. By listening to the almighty wisdom of our congressmen and women, as well as the all-knowing "regional analysts," you may fall under the delusion that success in Iraq is directly tied to how quickly we get out and give "incentives" to the clerical mullahs. The supposed genius of a Barbara Boxer is trumped up as sheer strategic brilliance, even as the elected Iraqi parliament pleads with CENTCOM commanders not to leave too hastily. The words of a Peter Arnett, the Adonis himself, are sure to prompt more coverage than that of General David Petraeus.

If we are to believe the storyline being fed to us, first the Bush team silenced those generals who wanted more boots on the ground, and propped up puppet generals who agreed with the course. Now those who disagree with the surge are being "forced out," whereas those officers who want more troops are being "installed" into positions of power. Apparently if a military commander agrees with the administration's policy, he is seen as cow-towing to his superiors; those that have differing points of view are held up by opponents as the sole military authority.

Those who championed Senator McCain as the Answer Man for the past three years now ridicule the former POW as a warmongering loner seeking to "escalate" the Iraqi war. Ditto this irony with other officials; Nouri Maliki is a puppet one day, a Shi'ite sectarian too close to the Sadrists the next. All of the charges employed against Mr. Bush have ostensibly been undermined: admittance of mistakes, failure to change course, and so forth. And yet his course change has won neither praise nor approval by an increasingly unhinged Congress. The change has instead won only enmity and continued caricatures. It apparently is a little bit too much in favor of perusing victory, solidifying previous achievements, and dismantling Iranian networks for the liking of Democratic and Republican dandelions.

We don't hear the word "withdraw" too much; "redeployment" is the preferred euphemism. The issue of timetables has come up as well. Unsurprisingly, in the Bizarro World that is the Beltway, those who routinely form phony Vietnam-Iraq comparisons are the first to endorse a Vietnam-clone policy of a timetabled pullout. Such a withdrawal, notified months in advance, would be absolutely catastrophic in an asymmetrical war of attrition such as this; allowing Ba'athist insurrectionists, Iranian marionette militias, and foreign jihadists to simply wait for our withdrawal deadlines before continuing the plunder of unarmed, and yet again abandoned, Iraqi innocents.

Whenever the Senate meets ad hoc to debate how and where and when we must ditch Iraq, we see an abject political stunt -- unabashed, unashamed, and seemingly unfamiliar with both history and the geopolitical landscape -- by a host of both Democratic and Republican leaders to get out of dodge at any and all cost; by a specific date no less. These disputes on withdrawal often seem to intensify precisely at moments when the jihadist movement in Iraq is dealt its harshest blows. When recently discovered al Qaida literature complains not of the imminence of an American extraction, but of the omnipresence of their American executioners, we look away. The letter, believed to have been written by Mr. al Zarqawi prior to his obliteration, whines and moans like a downtrodden incompetent that time is now on the side of the infidels.

We mustn't, even for a moment, submit to the unceasing assurances of a Chuck Hagel or a Dick Durban that nothing can be salvaged from overthrowing Hussein and birthing constitutionalism. Fascinatingly weird suggestions from the honorable John Murtha to redeploy to far away bases in far away places like Okinawa should be ignored; perhaps scoffed. It seems as if his sole response to those questioning his grand idea of departure is reminiscent of Senator Kerry's old fallback line: "Have you ever served in a war like me?" (And speaking of Mr. Kerry, in his ever-familiar monotone way, he continues to expose a window into the world we might have seen had he won the presidency, where he first demanded all Americans leave Iraq by the end of last year, had a weekend to think it over, and then returned with the proverbial, "Okay, okay, by mid-2007" -- seemingly grabbing artificial dates out of his derrière.)

Just how black and white are the fault lines between success and failure? Imagine southern Iraqi real estate controlled by Iranian agents, if not the Revolutionary Guard itself. Envision moderate, secular, and pluralistic Iraqi politicians murdered and killed by Iranian and Syrian assassins in the manner Lebanese reformers have met their maker due to Ba'athist-Khomeinist conspiracies. Try to foresee a scenario where the United States retreats in shame, only to have to retake the initiative in another half-decade or so -- except this time against the Islamic Republic of Iraq, as well as a nuclear Iranian theocracy. Oh, and don't forget the possibility of Wahhabi fundamentalists usurping Anbar and turning it into their own personal base of operations to recreate the ancient sultanate.

On the flip side, imagine a magic potion which could turn every al Qaida member into an enlightened, pacifistic, egalitarian cosmopolitan enchanted with American culture and the Western allure. However admittedly ludicrous that hypothetical scenario is, the benefits and potential outcome of seriously challenging Iran could be just as large and advantageously crucial in our counterterrorism efforts. Playing defense is a sucker's game. The American military is the biggest and nastiest militia in Iraq; we need to start acting like it. If we get serious, use this current surge in troops to begin dismantling Muqtada al Sadr's groupies, continue training Iraqi security forces, start arresting Iranian killers in Iraq, disrupting flows from neighboring states, hold the Syrians to account, renew efforts with the Lebanese government to disarm and dissolve the Hezbollah union, and start speaking openly about democratic revolution in Iran, the Bush administration, for all its gaffes and errors, has a chance at achieving something in the Middle East larger and far greater and long-term than the previous ten administration's combined.

But this will require sustained commitment and the use of additional ground forces as pillars against Iran. Everything can change almost overnight -- in Baghdad, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, our energy relationship with the Saudi royals, etc. -- if we politically engage the only Iranians we should be engaging: the democratic revolutionaries, human rights advocates, political prisoners, and brave dissidents who need the radios, computers, and expenditures to do what Eastern Europeans did two decades ago. Iranian sponsored terrorist movements in Sadr City and Beirut can be quelled in the manner Soviet surrogates were engaged in El Salvador and Nicaragua -- but in the end, the outcome of this war hinges on bringing the house down in Tehran.